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Abstract 
 
 Since the discovery of oil on the Peninsula in 1932, Saudi Arabian society has been 
fractured by societal changes. Petroleum revenue has enabled the Saud dynasty to engage in 
rentier policies and bypass traditional methods of wealth extraction, civic participation, and 
institutions to build social capital. But as new conditions render the rentier policies of the Saudi 
state unsustainable, socioeconomic institutions may again rise to political prominence. In Early 
Renaissance Florence, guilds gained control of the government in response to the inability of the 
old ruling class to respond to the new conditions of the late Middle Ages. The guilds fostered 
social capital, which led to Florentine political and cultural dominance throughout the 
Renaissance and allowed the Medici dynasty to consolidate political power. In modern Saudi 
Arabia, rentierism has enabled social capital to atrophy, but the fall of rentierism will require an 
alternative means of income generation if the Kingdom is to remain politically and socially 
stable. One tenable method of achieving this goal is to create social capital. Three institutions 
already extant in Saudi society appear theoretically capable of transitioning to fill this role: 
income-focused petroleum corporations, the state-sponsored religion known as Wahhabism, and 
tribal affiliations. This thesis argues that while none of these institutions by themselves are 
capable of accomplishing all the tasks of Florentine guilds, each may hold part of the key to 
extending the tenure of the Saud dynasty. The Saud are currently positioning these institutions to 
adapt for the future as the Saudi economy transitions from rentierism. A deeper understanding of 
how social capital interacts with modern Middle Eastern economic and societal transitions can 
be gained by comparing the unconventional cases of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  and 
the Renaissance Republic of Florence. 
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My grandfather rode a camel,  
my father rode a camel,  
I drive a Mercedes,  
my son drives a Land Rover,  
his son will drive a Land Rover,  
but his son will ride a camel. 
--- 
Attributed to  
Sheikh Rashid al Maktoum 
Emir of Dubai 
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Introduction 
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is facing imminent demographic, political, and social 
challenges in the 21st century. In the near future, Saudi Arabia will no longer be able to rely on 
oil wealth alone, and one or two years of oil revenues that exceed the forecast, temporarily 
building up the state’s coffers, will not change the long-term need for building a diversified 
economy in place of sustained reliance on a single unsustainable resource (Ramady 2010). One 
of its key economic objectives, therefore, is to move away from a state-driven economy largely 
dependent on oil revenue in order to create a more diversified economy.  
 Institutions within any society are interdependent and linked. They shape activity in three 
realms: political, economic and social. No institution falls exclusively within one sphere (Becker 
1968). When the Saudi economy shifts from petroleum export, some degree of social and 
political change will be inevitable. As this happens, the Saud monarchy will be unable to rely on 
oil revenue for power maintenance. A shift will occur within Saudi Arabia; political, economic, 
and social institutions will reform to meet the new internal and external conditions. What shape 
that this new society will take is very much in question, as is the future of the members of the 
House of Saud. Democratic governments are becoming the global norm (The Polity Project 
2014), and the Middle East seems to be one of the world’s last bastions for absolute monarchical 
government. The threat of falling oil profits, however, places the future of the ruling family into 
question.  
 The strategy of relying primarily on a single resource is called rentierism, and Saudi 
Arabia is the most conspicuous modern example of a rentier state. The Saud extract petroleum 
rents, bypassing the majority of the population in production. They then apply the oil profits to 
meet the needs of the people while simultaneously discouraging public participation in political 
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or economic processes. Rentierism will continue to protect the Saud absolute monarchy as long 
as petroleum exports supply adequate revenue.
1
 Oil has shaped every aspect of Saudi society, 
economics and politics since it was discovered in the 1930s. Members of the Saud family are 
interested in maintaining power for as long as possible, but it appears that an institutional change 
is inevitable during the coming century. Saudi Arabia will soon experience an economic 
transition away from oil as global consumption patterns shift to other energy sources. The Saudi 
oil industry will face a “serious, irreversible decline” (Simmons 2005) in the 21st century, and 
the Saudi monarchy will be unable to finance the initiatives which currently sustain the royal 
family’s rentier and redistribution economic policies. Once the Kingdom is unable to fund its 
rentier policies, public discontent will begin to threaten the regime.  
 In the event of mounting opposition during times of social unrest (examples include the 
1979 terrorist attack on Mecca, the 1991 Gulf War, the Riyadh and al-Khobar Towers bombings 
in 1995-1996, and the more recent Arab Spring uprisings) the Saudi government has had access 
to four possible avenues of response which are often used in combination (Ahrari 1997).
2
 The 
first is neutralizing the opposition by creating new welfare policies, effectively “buying off” the 
disgruntled citizens. This is the strategy that rentierism facilitates; it is simple and effective, but 
expensive and will become increasingly difficult as oil revenues decline. The second response is 
the blunt force suppression of political dissent with violence or oppression. This option damages 
the regime’s credibility internationally and does little to address the underlying causes of 
discontent while increasing the risk of escalating the unrest. The third option is investigating 
other options for improving economic conditions and the popular perception of the regime’s 
                                                          
1
 Care must be taken when generalizing causes of (in)stability in the Kingdom. Though oil revenue has assisted the 
Saud in extending the tenure of their rule, rentierism is not a panacea for all the problems of society.  
2
 Ahrari combines the 3rd and 4th response into a single point; they are separated here because of the possibility of 
using suppression without exploring economic solutions. 
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performance. This option is more complicated than the others, but has the benefits of being 
sustainable, progressive, and able to directly address the root causes of discontent. The fourth 
possible response is to open the political system and grant a voice to dissenters by creating public 
debate. This option is a last resort of a monarchy; since public political participation is inversely 
proportional to the power of a potentate, popularizing progressive democratic procedures 
proliferates the propensity for the people to push for power to pass to a president. This paper will 
explore unconventional tools for the Saud to pursue the third response as the first two become 
increasingly unsustainable. If this strategy is successful, the Saud will position themselves so that 
if the fourth option (democratization) becomes necessary, the royal family will maximize their 
chances of maintaining power during a democratic transition. 
 Discontent is dynamic and thus very difficult to predict, but demand for regime change is 
a common consequence of a government becoming unable to meet the needs of its populace. As 
oil incomes drop, systemic change in Saudi Arabia appears to be inevitable. Is the Kingdom 
destined to join the ranks of democratic nations? Are the days of the Saud monarchy numbered? 
These questions are the source of much excited speculation among political scientists, but 
perhaps a historical approach may enlighten the discussion.  
 The Medici dynasty, who rose to power in Florence, Italy during the Renaissance, 
provide a compelling comparison to the Saud dynasty. At the beginning of the Renaissance, the 
Medici were a modestly successful family of doctors and bankers within a city that appeared to 
value republican traditions above all else. Guilds had been an important part of the city’s civic 
and economic activity, and it was the guilds that taught the Medici their political acumen. Over 
the course of the Renaissance, the Medici power grew within the city-state of Tuscany, gaining 
power that eventually exceeded that of kings. They personally challenged Popes and confronted 
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the Holy Roman Emperor, yet ruled behind the scenes and held no noble titles. They guided the 
city-state to greatness, and in the late Renaissance the people who had once so vehemently 
embraced republicanism and civic participation chose to renounce republicanism and bestow 
upon members of the Medici rule the feudal title of Dukes.  
 All political systems prefer regime stability. If economic factors endanger the monarchy 
of the Saud royal family, wouldn’t the Saud prefer to retain their power?  Wouldn’t they prefer to 
continue as the Medici did, as ‘kings in all but name’ under the revised government, instead of 
resorting to Egyptian-style martial law or being wholly replaced by an administration beyond 
their control? By preemptively fostering institutions that will respond to economic change in 
predictable ways, the Saud royal family stands a better chance of maintaining their power during 
the state’s imminent transformation. Instead of fighting to maintain the status quo despite 
increasing odds, perhaps the Saud could leverage the power they currently hold within the 
Kingdom to secure for themselves a future similar to that of the Renaissance Medici, who ruled 
Florence both with and without a royal title.  If they can first shape civic institutions to mimic the 
operations of guilds and then position those institutions in the government, they could 
hypothetically extend their tenure as rulers into Saudi Arabia’s foreseeable future, holding the 
reins of the new Saudi government as the Medici guided Florence through the Renaissance.   
 The two cases are surprisingly similar in many ways. The Medici controlled fantastic 
wealth, as the Saud do now. The Medici gained a substantial portion of their popular legitimacy 
from the religious establishment, which was in practice subservient to them on matters where the 
two clashed. If anything, the Saud have a better resource in their long-standing relationship with 
Wahhabists, whom they control directly when necessary but allow a certain degree of autonomy. 
Furthermore, the Saud control of Mecca and Medina, along with the state’s massive investment 
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in mosques, religious education, and other cultural exports to Muslim nations throughout the 
world closely parallels the cultural output of Renaissance Florence, which for over a century was 
Western Europe’s cultural hegemon. Saudi Arabia also shares Florence’s advanced banking and 
financial sector, an educated yet relatively unproductive middle class, and a ruling class with a 
direct controlling stake in export-fueled industry. 
 The dependent variable of this case study is the level of social capital that a society can 
generate and direct toward specific political institutions. Social capital is based on the idea that 
social networks are an important factor in the production of material and immaterial resources. 
The presence of rentierism is the most important difference between Saudi Arabia and 
Renaissance Florence.
3
 Nowhere else in Europe was social capital as strong as in Florence, 
where community identity was extremely developed, civic participation was high, and 
community members directly shaped the government. And perhaps nowhere are these aspects of 
society as conspicuously absent as in modern Saudi Arabia. The social institutions of modern 
Saudi Arabia are almost diametrically opposed to those of early Renaissance Florence. The 
Florentines valued republicanism and direct civic involvement in government, while the people 
of Saudi Arabia have a tradition of autocracy, authoritarianism, and more recently rentierism. 
These political characteristics are both shaped by and reflected in the Kingdom’s current social 
and economic landscape.  
 Can aspects of the institutions which guided the economic transition of Early Renaissance 
Florence be applied to Saudi Arabian society to ease the political and social unrest during its 
upcoming economic transition? This essay will begin with a review of the literature relevant to 
this approach to the discussion of modern Saudi society, defining the unique set of circumstances 
                                                          
3
 Beblawi and Luciani are careful to note that an open economy with high foreign trade is not a rentier state simply 
because it relies on the outside world, even if it generates its income from natural endowment (for instance, tourism) 
in as far as the majority of the society is engaged in the process of wealth generation (1990). 
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that the Saud dynasty faces. It will then evaluate the socioeconomic history of Renaissance 
Florence using the institutions of the guilds as a point of reference. This will provide a 
framework for discussing the viability of certain social institutions within changing contexts. 
Then focus will shift to modern Saudi Arabian society, highlighting the rise of rentierism as the 
single greatest factor which accounts for the differences in social capital between the two 
societies. This essay will conclude with an examination of the three institutions which now 
dominate the social landscape of Saudi Arabia: industry, religion, and tribal relationships. It will 
evaluate how each of these three institutions have reacted to changing conditions and how they 
might be used by the Saud to extend their rule beyond rentierism.  
 In the last decade Saudi leadership has begun to pursue initiatives which use these three 
institutions to nurture social capital, but the incompatibility of social capital generation with 
rentierism has initially retarded the success of these initiatives. By continuing to foster social 
capital among citizens despite the obstacles associated with rentierism, the Kingdom may be able 
to develop the social capital that Saudi Arabia needs in order to mitigate the effects of a steep 
decline in living standards, disastrous protest, and societal chaos as state welfare coffers run dry.  
  
Theoretical Framework 
 Social capital refers to the value of social networks. The term was first described in 1916 
by Lyda Hanifan, who called it “those tangible assets [that] count for most in the daily lives of 
people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse” (Hanifan 1916). The 
term refers to the shared values, relationships, and interactions that enable individuals and groups 
to understand and trust each other and thus work together. Social capital works through multiple 
channels. Examples of social capital in action include barn-raising on the American frontier, 
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monthly newsletters sent by a club or association, and students meeting together to study for an 
upcoming test.  
 Social capital is distinct from social identity theory. Social identity theory refers to a 
perceived self-identification with an in-group, and the term is generally used to discuss  
interactions between different groups of people (Turner & Reynolds 2010). Discussions about 
nationalism, racism, and religious intolerance are referring to social identity. Social capital, on 
the other hand, refers to the ability of social connections to be channeled into productive 
undertakings. Social capital can be leveraged to produce economic value (trade shows), pursue 
political goals (grassroots petitions in the US), enhance education (study groups), and promote 
general welfare (office employees working together to ease the burden of an injured colleague).  
 The term has been revived in recent years with the work of sociologist Robert Putnam, 
who defines social capital as “social networks, and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them” (Putnam 2000, 19), and admits that it can have drawbacks in addition to its 
benefits. Social capital is an integral part of a functioning democracy (ibid.) but, as we shall see, 
does not necessarily lead to democratic government. Social capital is built by civil society, which 
includes non-governmental and community organizations (ibid.). Civil society, in turn, naturally 
emerges from a cohesive social environment built by social relations and communications 
between citizens (Bryant 1995).  
 Social capital shapes and is shaped by political factors, and “the nature and extent of the 
interactions between communities and institutions holds the key to understanding the prospects 
for development in a given society” (Woolcock & Narayan 2000, 19). A society that adopts 
institutions which promote social capital is better able to overcome collective action problems 
and engage in reciprocally cooperative behavior (Uphoff 1999). For most societies, these 
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capabilities benefit both state and citizenry. However, due to the peculiar relationship between 
the government and the governed in a rentier state, for much of the 20th century in Saudi Arabia 
they were undesirable.  
 The work of historian Charles Tilly described how a state’s political institutions are 
shaped by the social interactions of its people and the security needs of the state (Tilly 1990). 
Tilly’s conclusion that “war makes states so states can make war” is an attempt to build on 
Weberian notions of statehood, adding that European states developed methods of extracting and 
directing wealth from their citizens. An important corollary to his thesis highlights the 
importance of social capital in creating productive economic and political institutions (Tilly 
2000). Other scholars have expanded on his work, such as Rolf Schwarz (2004) who, by arguing 
against a constructivist approach in Middle Eastern studies, allows Tilly’s conclusions to be 
applied to modern rentier states like Saudi Arabia that arose from conditions other than those of 
medieval Europe. The capability of a state government to extract and direct wealth from the 
people is associated with various internal and external factors that change over time. The 
influence and structure of socioeconomic institutions fluctuates in response to changes in a 
state’s capabilities and resources. 
 The link between social capital and economics begins with the works of Durkheim and 
Weber, who explained that the values or norms within a certain culture or segment of society can 
alter how members of that group participate in economic activity. Social norms and institutions 
can influence economic activity within a society, and institutions which are developed by a 
community to address its particular set of problems cannot necessarily be applied to other 
societies with equal success (Sahlins 1972). Economic behavior is at “least tripartite in nature: 
social, moral, and economic” (Sahlins 1972, 200), and these three factors must be considered in 
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tandem to understand variances in economic institutions. Economic activity in Renaissance 
Florence was strongly influenced by the city’s high levels of social capital (Stuard 2006). The 
social capital in the city was most clearly visible in the actions of a single set of institutions: the 
guilds.  
 Guilds in Europe emerged in response to regional conditions and, once formed, leveraged 
the social capital they fostered to exert pressure on political institutions (Black 1984). In the 
Arabian Peninsula the existence of institutions similar to guilds has shaped civic identity to 
varying degrees during periods when a centralized government was unable or unwilling to do so 
(Yildirim 2006; Dünyas  & Meselesi 2010), including periods of weak Byzantine or Ottoman 
rule. Robert Michel’s “Iron Law of Oligarchy” helps to explain the ebb and flow of these 
institutions which, over time, “displace their original goals, become wedded to routine, and 
ultimately accept the rules of the game of the existing system” (Tarrow 2011: 123). By virtue of 
their position between the state and the market, civic organizations such as guilds are able adapt 
to capture community needs and to provide service and advocacy functions to meet the needs of 
citizens (Borzaga & Sforzi 2014). Rentierism has enabled the Saudi monarchy to meet the 
temporal needs of its citizens, and has neglected or discouraged the formation of institutions 
which may threaten its sovereignty. Today guilds, social clubs, and independent community 
associations are rare in the Kingdom, which provides little legal protection to institutions which 
it cannot closely monitor or directly control.  
 External rents of oil export revenue represent more than 60% of Saudi Arabia’s state 
income (Cordesman 2003). The discovery of oil and the ability of Saudi Arabia to extract 
massive revenues while completely bypassing the populace enabled the Saud to implement an 
unprecedented new set of institutional mechanisms. Rentierism fosters behavior patterns of 
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dependence among citizens and discourages private sector participation in favor of revenue 
reallocation (Beblawi & Luciani 1990). This means that the Saud dynasty’s “economic power 
and ultimately their political authority rest on their dual capacity to extract rents externally from 
the global environment and subsequently distribute these revenues internally” (Karl, 1997, 49). 
Hertog uses the concept of ‘segmented clientelism’ to complement rentier state theory; this paper 
will refer to wasta (Hertog 2010) which performs this role in Saudi society. As long as Saudi 
Arabia expects to rely on rentierism and has no powerful enemies to fight (Tilly 1990), the 
Kingdom has no pressing need to encourage social capital.  
 However, the future of Saudi oil is in doubt (Pierce 2012; Simmons 2005). Because of 
large reserves and relatively consistent discoveries of new oil reserves, oil as an energy resource 
will not be exhausted in the foreseeable future. Rather, when the price to extract oil reaches such 
a point that it becomes greater than the worth of the oil extracted, oil production will decline 
(Adelman 1995). Saudi oil policy is thus focused on maintaining a “moderate” price (Pierce 
2012). Under-production will raise prices in the short term and might extend the longevity of the 
Kingdom’s oil reserves, but will accelerate foreign investment in non-crude energy sources such 
as solar, shale oil, or nuclear power, and thus lead to demand destruction. On the other hand, 
over-production will deflate the price of oil over the short term, which will decrease demand 
destruction but drain the wells faster and will limit the Kingdom’s budget initially due the short-
term inelasticity of oil demand. Even if policies are successful in maintaining a steady, moderate 
price, alternatives to Saudi oil are becoming less expensive and more viable as technological 
developments, fuelled by a combination of environmental concerns (Bahgat 2013) and the 
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adaptation of technologies being developed in other sectors,
5
 result in a bleak outlook for Saudi 
oil exports over the next century.  
 While overall global energy demand is expected to  rise, producers are transitioning to 
lower-carbon and domestically-available fuels; the areas of natural gas, nuclear, solar, biofuel, 
wind, and hydro power are all expected to outpace growth in demand for liquid oil. Though the 
Middle East is expected to remain the world’s top exporter of liquid fuels until at least 2040, 
North America’s unconventional gas output is expected to exceed the Middle East’s total gas 
production around the year 2020 (Exxon Mobil 2015)
6
. Global demand for oil is forecast to 
decrease by 15% in 25 years (ibid.) even as the rapidly-growing Saudi population consumes an 
increasing portion of the Kingdom’s reserves at heavily subsidized rates7, thus decreasing the 
amount available for export (Bahgat 2013). Finally, oil wells in Saudi Arabia have been pumping 
the Kingdom’s most accessible oil for over fifty years. Though the Kingdom still has plenty of 
reserves on paper, these fields tend to be deeper or otherwise more expensive to access. All these 
factors combined will combine to steadily reduce Saudi Arabia’s oil profits, and therefore its 
ability to sustain rentierism, over the course of the 21st century.  
 The Saud family has so far been successful in their attempts to use rentierism to extend 
the tenure of the monarchy. But as oil income falls, they will need to adopt a new approach to 
governance in order to maintain power. If they are unable to develop an alternate method of 
producing the resources demanded by society, they will face increasing demands for regime 
                                                          
5
 A few examples: new batteries developed for cell phones may increase the performance of electric and hybrid 
vehicles, research on silicon and carbon components for computers may be adapted to increase solar panel efficiency, 
and safer forms of nuclear power generation may reverse negative public perceptions. 
6
 This is to a degree contingent upon fluctuations in oil prices as discussed above. 
7
 In the coming years the Kingdom will burn more oil to produce the energy needed to meet its growing fresh water 
needs. Booming population, developing economy, and water scarcity have compounded Saudi electricity demand. 
The demand for electricity has risen at an annual rate of 8% in recent years and is expected to triple by 2032. 
According to a study in 2010, the electricity consumption per capita in Saudi Arabia was more than three times the 
global average. (Bahgat  2013: 568) 
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change. This paper will look to Renaissance Florence as a source for inspiration to inform Saudi 
Arabian governance decisions.  
 The exciting aspect of this project is that it attempts to reconcile a number of various 
disciplines; sociology, political science, economics, history, and a sprinkling of religious studies. 
These disciplines can tend to be rather myopic as individual scholars become specialized in a 
single field, resulting in each discipline creating its own vocabulary and viewing events from 
different perspectives. When writing books, researchers tend to focus on one single field, or 
perhaps the interplay between two disciplines.  
 When discussing the political aspects of this thesis, it appears that that little overlap lies 
between scholars of the Italian Renaissance and scholars of modern Saudi Arabia. Therefore, an 
additional benefit of this project lies in the opportunity to compare two cases which are seldom 
considered together. Renaissance historians wrote their accounts within different contexts 
changing interpretations based on the political weltgeist in which they lived (for example, much 
of the scholarly discussion of Florence’s guilds in the early 1900s compared them to communist 
ideas, but by the 1980s they were discussed using the language of corporatism), while all the 
scholars discussing 21st century Saudi Arabia all tend to ‘play by the same set of rules’ which 
match our current understanding of the world. It seems that, like social institutions, even the 
nature of political discussion changes within certain contexts. 
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Part One: The Florentine Renaissance 
 The early Renaissance is a period in European history associated with a spectacular 
burgeoning of culture, and the city of Florence was its crown jewel. Artists created breathtaking 
masterpieces, great advances were made in political and natural science, and information spread 
faster and more thoroughly than ever before. Northern Italy was at the crest of this wave of 
innovation and progress. Yet this period was also one of economic and political turmoil for the 
region. Social patterns changed urban patterns of consumption which led to an increase in 
unproductive but culturally significant luxury goods. New theories describe an economic 
“transformation” in which economic shocks and a lack of new industrial technologies were 
overcome by social innovations (Najimy 2004: 125) shaped by the city’s guilds. The actions of 
these institutions in response to changing conditions can provide a perspective for addressing 
Saudi Arabia’s current situation.  
 
Guilds as Socio-political Actors in Renaissance Florence 
 At the beginning of the Renaissance, around 1300 AD, the city of Florence was the 
capital of the small city-state of Tuscany in northern Italy. Florence was a relatively wealthy city, 
but was not especially noteworthy even among other northern Italian city-states. By the year 
1500 AD, however, it was unquestionably one of the most prominent cities in Europe. This 
transition coincided with economic turmoil, intense regional competition and war, religious 
factionalism and extremism, a considerable economic shift from agriculture to the service and 
luxury goods industries, class struggles, financial difficulties and intellectual turbulence.
8
 The 
guilds in Florence were able to guide the city’s development through their domination of both 
                                                          
8
 All of these conditions can be found in Saudi Arabia today; some are incidental to this paper, while others will be 
discussed in more detail shortly. 
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politics and industry. The influence of these institutions permeated Florentine society and 
literally shaped the city, contributing materially not only to its temporary rise in prominence but 
also the city’s return to banality by the 1700s as conditions within Florence and the rest of 
Europe changed.  
 A guild can be defined as a “government-licensed, local, professional associations” of 
craftsmen or merchants (Durgun 2009). They can be seen as “urban industrial organizations in 
which manual workers, merchants, or handicraft production as a whole were organized by the 
members of the same occupation who provided each other with mutual support (Yildirim 2006). 
These two definitions together give a satisfying account of the notion that, although guilds tend 
to be organized along economic lines, they are nonetheless influential in political and social 
spheres. In Saudi Arabia the exclusion of the majority of the population from wealth generation 
and extraction, combined with the Kingdom’s dynastic monarchy, meant that institutions such as 
these, unless carefully controlled by the state, pose a threat to stability. A wealthy populace 
might gather the resources to challenge the state, especially in a society like Saudi Arabia in 
which citizens are poorly represented. Strong social and economic networks further increase the 
risk, as such institutions enable a disgruntled society to more quickly mobilize resources against 
the government. As a result, under rentierism Saudi Arabia has discouraged the growth of social 
capital unless the state can reliably control it.  
 The modern analogue of medieval guilds lies somewhere between a church, a corporation, 
and a trade union (Becker 1968; Black 1984). The Roman Empire was among the first to 
encourage the formation of civic trade associations, which were known as collegia. The collegia 
were more men’s social clubs than economic cooperatives, but they were generally organized 
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around certain industries and each had its own distinguishing ethos (Black 1984: 14). In his book 
Guilds and Civil Society, Anthony Black explains the similarities: 
The early social guild formed one basis for the later craft-guild, an evolution which may 
(using Durkheim’s language) be described as the developments of ‘segments’ into 
‘organs’ of society: that is, groups originally general and identical in function gradually 
assumed specialized and differentiated roles in particular branches of economic life. They 
were indeed the cells of a new kind of society (Black 1984, 3). 
The English name is related to the German Geld, which means ‘money’, possibly referring to the 
entrance and membership fees that the organizations collected (Black 1984), but the Italians 
called them arta.  
 An arta was an organization for craftsmen to share and advance their arts, but they also 
served many other functions in political, economic, and social spheres. Examples of industries 
represented by guilds include butchers, doctors, judges and notaries, and bankers. The lower 
classes, such as farmers, porters, and unskilled laborers were prohibited from creating guilds of 
their own, though they could join existing guilds if they could pay the entry fee and demonstrate 
competence. The entry fee served as a barrier to entry for most commoners, prohibiting them 
from being eligible for leadership positions while permitting them to participate economically 
and socially through employment as unskilled laborers. The majority of Florentine citizens could 
not afford to join a guild, but they nonetheless self-identified as participating in one guild or 
another, and participated in guild events such as parades, religious observances and charity 
drives.  
 Guild halls were funded by membership dues, and these buildings hosted social events, 
organized religious services, and housed distinguished visitors. They were decorated (and 
situated) to maximize the prestige of the guild and evoke feelings of participation, belonging and 
pride within the community. Guild halls were sites of exchange where members gave up 
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neighborhood allegiances to work toward an overlapping corporate good, but the influence of the 
guild extended far beyond these edifices (Crum and Paoletti 2006). Guild members saw each 
other as brothers or friends who were entitled to mutual aid (Black 1984). Guilds defined a sort 
of kinship and so fostered what Marshall Sahlins calls ‘generalized reciprocity’ in economic 
sociability (Sahlins 1972: 124). Obligations to non-guild members were dependent on the degree 
to which producer and consumer interests were compatible, and at no point did guild 
membership outweigh family ties (Black 1984) though family bonds certainly did weaken over 
the course of the Renaissance (Becker 1968). Cooperation was not limited to guild allies. The 
Florentine guilds employed people not just within the capital city, but across the city-state of 
Tuscany. 
 The most significant way in which Florentine arta stood apart from other European 
guilds of the time was the fact that the guilds themselves controlled the government directly 
(Becker 1968). In 1115 A.D., de jure feudal rule over Florence had ended with the death of 
Matilda of Tuscany, though the old titled nobility (grandi) retained a good deal of their authority, 
ruling in a de facto oligarchy (Brown 2006; Najemy 2006). In the minds of Florentine citizens, 
the guilds were an institution that empowered the popolo (literally ‘people’, but in practice the 
middle class) against the grandi who were perceived as unproductive, self-interested enemies of 
republicanism (Najemy 2006). The grandi were thus removed from power in stages beginning 
with the enacting of a democratic constitution in 1228 (Brown 2006; Paoletti and Crum 2006). 
Florentine politics were guided by the Signoria, a council of nine citizens, selected by a process 
of sortition from members of the city’s guilds, to serve two-month terms as the city’s primary 
legislative body (Paoletti and Crum 2006). The only official prerequisite for candidacy was 
membership (in good standing) in one of the city’s guilds. By 1293, the twenty-one most 
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powerful guilds in the city had consolidated their power and the Signoria prohibited the 
formation of new major guilds, though their grip on power would often be challenged (Becker 
1968; Brown 2006). In this way, the guilds maintained control of Florentine politics throughout 
the early Renaissance. Though actual popular governments underwent several changes, the civic, 
cultural, and intellectual achievement of the guilds had an overwhelming long-term impact 
(Najemy 2004). The victory of the popolo over the grandi cemented a Florentine tradition of a 
nascent form of social contract theory in which members of government were answerable to their 
peers for their actions. Mechanisms were developed to ensure they could be replaced if they 
failed to represent popular will. At the time, this was a rare concept in much of Europe. For 
example, Putnam explains that northern Italy’s primary developmental advantage over southern 
Italy was the fact that in the south, foreign monarchs "destroy[ed] horizontal ties of solidarity in 
order to maintain the primacy of vertical ties of dependence and exploitation." (Putnam 1993, 
136). This prevented it from matching the levels of Renaissance activity generated by the north 
as a result of the latter’s strong social capital. 
 Guild involvement in Florence’s government explains why modern members of the Saud 
dynasty may be interested in replicating their behavior. The King and Princes who currently rule 
Saudi Arabia are presumably interested in extending the tenure of the monarchy, and if social 
capital is unavoidably linked with democratic governance, then guilds (or similar institutions) 
may jeopardize that goal. As we shall see, Florentine guilds generated massive amounts of social 
capital but did not inevitably lead to democratic political institutions or necessarily strengthen 
republican tendencies. This suggests that the Saud might potentially capture the productivity 
generated by social capital while simultaneously preserving the monarchy.  
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 The Florentine transition from grandi to popolo was facilitated by a new set of 
socioeconomic conditions which toppled the status quo in Tuscany at the end of the Middle Ages. 
Wars grew in number and intensity. Many Florentine banks (owned by grandi) collapsed as 
defeated foreign rulers defaulted on massive loans they had used to hire mercenary armies 
(Stuard 2006). A string of cold and rainy seasons further decreased harvests and jeopardized 
eastern trade routes (ibid.). The Black Death, which first arrived in Italy in 1348 on a Genoese 
ship returning from a trade outpost in Crimea (Tilly 1992), hit Tuscany harder than almost any 
other region of Europe, killing close to half the population of the commune (city-state) over the 
course of 50 years. It devastated the Florentine workforce and sent shockwaves through the 
Italian economy. But while the Black Death reduced the population, it did not affect land and 
capital (Malanima cited in Najimy 2004). The per capita wealth of Florence increased as a result 
of the reduced population. A smaller population also required less food overall, and the price of 
food dropped, reducing the strain on the economy for around a century (Malanima 2009). The 
Black Death created economic opportunity for the middle and lower classes, who were now able 
to consume better food and purchase better textile products (Cipolla cited in Najimy 2004). 
Many rural farmers, unable to make a profit off their crops and seeking physical safety, moved to 
empty homes in the city and found employment in the guilds. The guilds welcomed the cheap 
labor, and Tuscany became one of the most urbanized regions of Europe (Malanima 2009).  
 Newly-urbanized citizens were incorporated into the nuanced Florentine political 
atmosphere through codified guild statutes. Great political questions were debated in the guild 
halls so that the new citizenry, the novi cives, could become familiar with the city’s politics. 
Elected administrators administered common funds and enforced regulations (Black 1984). 
Guild members drafted new legislation which became law through the agents of the Signoria 
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(Becker 1968). One of these laws was the requirement of a citizen to serve a period of political 
apprenticeship in one of the city’s guilds for a period of between ten and twenty-five years 
before he was eligible for the Signoria.  
 Immigrants to Florence were not surprised by the city’s atmosphere of public political 
participation. A great many of them had held public office in their rural parishes before they 
immigrated to the city. Rural town councils were also strongly influenced by local assemblies, so 
many of Florence’s new citizens arrived in the city with an expectation of political participation, 
and they were accustomed to defending their political rights against all those who sought to 
dispute them (Becker 1968).  Luckily, in Florence, the interests of the urban rulers tended to 
align with those of the popolo, so although sporadic unrest occurred, these two groups tended to 
cooperate politically (ibid.). A social sense of belonging was fostered by the socially-visible 
production of the various guilds; Florentine citizens could see the results of their work as their 
efforts and institutions visibly shaped the society and politics of the world around them. 
 Over time, generalized reciprocity extended beyond guild membership and into the 
greater social sphere of Tuscan society. As new skilled workers moved into the city, medieval 
ties loosened and ritual identity slackened (Becker 1968). The popolo were firmly in control of 
the city’s politics, and the old aristocratic families realized this. By the 1360s, several dozen of 
the oldest Florentine families had renounced their coats-of-arms and even changed their family 
named to gain coveted “commoner” status. In a tight-knit community like Florence, this also 
served to distance their own reputations from the misdeeds of ancestors or kinsmen (for example, 
within the context of the context Guelf/Ghibelline feud which loomed over much of Italian 
politics in the 14th and 15th centuries). As the commune provided better physical and legal 
protection to an individual, the latter could afford to slacken kinship bonds, venturing out on his 
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own and gaining a “second family” in the guilds. Reciprocity and trust expanded, facilitating 
economic growth and stimulating social interactions.  
 Over the course of the Early Renaissance, a new ruling class emerged within the context 
of the traditional republic. By the time the Medici became the de facto rulers of the city in 1434, 
contemporary Florentine writers were already noticing that the city was being increasingly 
governed at supper parties and in private studies rather than the palace. Distinguished visitors to 
the city were advised to visit the Medici palazzo instead of the city hall as their first destination 
upon arrival. While the outward appearance of a republic remained intact, many Florentine 
citizens understood that Florentine republicanism was becoming a “folklore” (Brown 2011: xvi-
xvii). Since their material needs were being met, they were content to surrender increasing 
amounts of control to the Medici family, which had developed a reputation acting in the interests 
of the popolo. 
 I have greatly simplified this tumultuous period of Florentine political history in the 
interest of brevity; the reader should not infer that the incorporation of guilds into direct 
government led to political stability. Conspiracies, uprisings, attempted coups d’etat, and street 
rebellions were quite common in Florence throughout the entire Renaissance, and the Signoria 
constantly adjusted its policies to maintain stability (Ricciardelli 2007). “Mutar lo stato” was a 
commonly-heard adage (Brown 2006: n.p.).
9
 Those who served in the Signoria were expected to 
represent all of Tuscany, but the interests of their guilds were never far from their minds. 
Whenever possible, they sought to gain social prestige and the approval of their peers by 
                                                          
9Roughly translated to “The state changes”. This term gained prominence by merit of its presence in Machiavelli’s 
The Prince. Incidentally, The Prince was almost certainly written with the implicit (if not the primary) intent of 
bringing Machiavelli into Lorenzo de Medici’s favor (they had quarreled). Since his other writings suggest a 
preference  for a stable republican system of governance, it might be argued that The Prince was little more than a 
sycophant’s Machiavellian (irony) bid for political amnesty (Maas 2013: 18). Nonetheless, perhaps due to its lucky 
publication coinciding with the rapid growth in popularity of Gutenberg’s movable type press, the book’s ideas 
became quite popular and have shaped western thought up to the present day.  
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enacting measures that increased the wealth and status of whichever guild they represented. The 
Signoria immediately began to enact policies which shaped economic activity. By enabling guild 
members to guide the government, Florence was able to increase profit from industries and 
practices that had been in use for centuries. The two institutions which were most influential in 
this regard were the banking guild (arte del cambio) and the wool guild (arta della lana). 
Combined, these two guilds accounted for over half of all economic activity in Florence. The 
activities of these groups serve as useful examples for guild involvement in the city’s 
government, economy and society. 
 
Guild Socioeconomics in Florentine Context 
  The arte del cambio maximized its ability to use its position in the government to 
increase profit. An early priority for all members of the Signoria was the reduction of barriers to 
trade, enabling Florentine merchants to increase their customer base beyond the borders of 
Tuscany. The Signoria protected property rights and provided consumers protection against 
unscrupulous business dealings. In every industry, guild leadership monitored and regulated 
production, establishing clearly defined grades of quality that customers could rely on (Stuard 
2006). In 1252 A.D., Florence had begun to mint its own coinage, the florin, which soon became 
a popular currency throughout Europe due to its reputation for purity (Crum and Paoletti 2006) 
which was carefully managed and preserved by the arte del cambio. This action was an indicator 
of the growing economic clout of the city and served as the foundation for future economic 
dominance (Paoletti and Crum 2006). Members of the Florentine banking guild managed 
branches in cities throughout Europe, and its bankers collaborated with local merchants to reach 
new markets, finance large purchases, and otherwise lubricate business transactions. “By mid-
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fourteenth century, merchant capitalism had already perfected the instruments of economic 
power and business organization that were to serve it for the next four hundred years: foreign 
exchange, deposit banking, risk insurance public finance, international trading companies, 
commercial bookkeeping” (John Day in Stuard 2006: 220). The arte del cambio shared effective 
strategies among its members, who assisted each other in times of hardship to preserve the 
reputation of the florin and of the guild.
10
  
 The success of the banking guild was only matched by the larger wool guild, the arta 
della lana, (Stuard 2006). This guild was an active participant in shaping the new social and 
economic dimensions of the city (Crum and Paoletti 2006). Florentine craftsmen had a well-
designed supply chain, mediated and shaped by the guild, which guided the processing of wool 
into cloth. Florentine traders dispatched merchants to purchase English wool, contracted 
Venetian ships to transport it to Italy, and processed it locally into a grade of wool that was 
superior to any other (Stuard 2006). A large source of alum in the Tuscan town of Volterra 
provided the material that gave the arta della lana a competitive advantage in luxury wool 
production and export. Additionally, a local lichen called oricello enabled guildsmen to produce 
the most striking red dyes on the continent. By 1338, Florence’s annual textile production 
(mostly wool, but some silk as well) was estimated at 100,000 sections of cloth, produced in 
some 300 locations across the city and employing as many as 30,000 workers, corresponding to 
roughly half the city’s population, though most of these workers belonged to the lower classes 
and were not guild members (Brown 2006).  
                                                          
10
 The arte del cambio also contributed to the development of Florentine identity through the ingenious mechanism 
of the sale of government bonds. The government was able to compensate for budgetary shortfalls by selling bonds 
to its citizens. Thus the citizens were not just bound to Florence socially, but also financially; a great many 
Florentine citizens held a direct monetary stake in the success of the city (see Niall Ferguson’s The Ascent of Money; 
Becker 1968: 151-155) .  
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 Other Florentine guilds, less endowed in locally-obtainable natural resources, were not as 
economically successful as the banking and wool guilds, but their contribution to Florence’s 
civic nationalism can nevertheless not be discounted.
11
 Financial struggles in these smaller guilds 
were to a large extent offset by the ability of the arta della lana to maximize its competitive 
advantage. They found it in their advantage to work in cooperation with the wool and banking 
guilds. Goldsmiths, for example, produced gold thread and filigree to decorate the finest wool 
fabrics. These industries depended on technological advances to remain competitive, but the 
early Renaissance did not bring many new production techniques (Malanima 2009). Industrial 
production, like agricultural production, still used technology that had been around for centuries. 
The output of the guilds increased as their membership grew, but per capita output and urban 
wages remained relatively steady after an initial spike associated with the labor shortage brought 
by the plague (ibid.). Technological advances which introduced new, more efficient production 
only began to be introduced in the late 14th century. Florentine wool workshops in the arta della 
lana had been mostly using labor-intensive methods that had existed for hundreds of years and 
were in use throughout Europe (Stuard 2006). Since production per worker remained relatively 
stable, the workshops needed more workers to increase production as demand grew. This was 
another cause of high levels of urbanization and immigration.  
 Though the majority of wealth in Florence was associated with only two of the city’s 
guilds, Florence does not fit the definition of a rentier economy. In a rentier economy, the state 
focuses on the development of a single sector of the economy at the expense of the other sectors 
and then redistributes this direct income to the majority. Since the Florentine economy was so 
                                                          
11
 Trexler in Public Life in Renaissance Florence implies that the guilds were similar to American sports teams in 
this regard. Even if the Seahawks or the Yankees appear to objectively be the best teams year after year, people still 
take pride in rooting for their own local teams, and friendly competition fosters civic nationalism. The Saddlers 
Guild might have been the San Diego Padres of Florentine socioeconomics, but they nevertheless had fans who 
proudly wore their colors. 
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diversified and interdependent, the guild members in the Signoria prevented the Florentine 
economy from favoring a single industry. Florence can more accurately be called a redistributive 
welfare state, in which tax profits from one class of society are distributed among members of 
other sections of society (Ramady 2010). This was accomplished through direct taxation of all 
citizens as well as informally through various guild charities.   
 Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its ability to develop highly efficient institutions similar 
to these two guilds; the Saudi Arabian banking sector is robust and well-organized, and the 
petroleum extraction industry (which, similar to the wool guild, relies on a comparative 
advantage) is also extremely efficient. Since income generation and management are the most 
important economic sectors for the Saud ruling class, these industries have become extremely 
powerful in Saudi Arabia. The difference lies in the fact that in Saudi Arabia these two sectors 
are largely insulated from public participation, while in Florence the vast majority of people 
interacted with the guilds on a regular basis. The Saudi system discourages the growth of social 
capital, while the Florentine guilds nurtured it. 
 
Religion and Guilds 
 The influence of religion on this system deserves mention, and in fact religion can 
usefully be considered in combination with our three original spheres: economic, social, and 
political. The Protestant Reformation occurred near the end of the Renaissance, so for most of 
this period religious behavior in Florence was perceived in terms of the competing 
Guelph/Ghibbeline religious factions, which supported the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor 
respectively. Florence was nominally aligned with the Guelphs, though the relationship between 
the Pope and the city’s inhabitants tended to be tumultuous throughout this period, to state it 
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mildly. But on practical matters within the city, the allegiance of the clergy was first to the 
people and government of Florence, with the Pope taking a distinctly second place. Tuscan 
prelates were “citizens before they were priests” and tended to be “comfortably indifferent” to 
Rome’s wishes when they conflicted with the interests of the Signoria (Trollope 1865: 370). In 
fact, though the entire city of Florence was twice placed under Papal interdict (in 1376 by Pope 
Gregory XI and a century later by Pope Sixtus), these interdicts were largely ignored by the 
people.
12
 “The Papal interdict remained utterly inoperative in Florence [… a]nd  doubtless many 
a pious Florentine citizen never heard anything about the interdict at all” (ibid.). Florentine 
clergy also supported the guilds in exploiting the lower classes for profit. Bruce Brown explains: 
Georges Renard noted how, at the insistence of the arta della lana, local priests read 
pastoral letters to their flocks three times a year threatening to deny communion to 
rebellious spinners. Workers thus cast out could only gain re-admittance to the fold by 
paying large sums to the priests, which provided the church with a significant source of 
revenue, and made it resistant to reform, although some ecclesiastics denounced the 
system. (2006: n.p.) 
 
Though religion was vitally important to the people of Florence, it seems that in the event of a 
dispute between church and state, Florentine citizens and clergy alike tended to take the side of 
the state. They perceived themselves as pious, but religion, it appears, could be remarkably 
flexible in interpretation and application of specific doctrines and rites. Despite differences in 
                                                          
12
 An interdict meant that all religious rites were forbidden and technically declared Florentine citizenship “illegal”. 
The first occurred during The War of the Eight Saints. This situation lasted for 11 years, until Gregory died and his 
successor removed the interdict. A century later in 1478, Pope Sixtus hired a band of mercenaries to assassinate 
Lorenzo de Medici and his younger brother on the front row of the city’s cathedral during Easter Mass. On the day 
in question, Lorenzo’s brother was not in attendance, so the assassins went to his house where he was laying in bed 
severely ill and had him carried to the church so that they could murder him. Despite their efforts, the assassins 
nonetheless failed to kill the head of the family, Lorenzo, who escaped with minor wounds. Lorenzo used the event 
to consolidate power in Florence by publicly executing the assassins, as well as number of his political enemies 
(including the Archbishop of Pisa, who happened to be visiting Florence). Upon hearing of the assassin’s failure and 
execution of the Archbishop, Pope Sixtus excommunicated Lorenzo and placed another interdict on the entire city of 
Florence. Again, it was utterly ignored by most Florentines.  Two years later, in 1480, The Pope relented and lifted 
the interdict. 
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religious tenets, Florence and Saudi Arabia are strikingly similar in this regard; religion, though a 
vital aspect of civic life, is in practice subordinate to the wishes of the ruling class. 
 
Guilds and Social Transformation in Florence  
 Guilds in Florence were superbly designed to shape economic output in a way that 
provided a fertile environment for socialization. Florentine production techniques changed 
remarkably little in the early Renaissance (Malanima 2009); the important change was the 
increased quantity, variety and mobility of goods that guilds cultivated. Italians consumed a 
greater variety of products, and had access to increasing amounts of luxury and imported goods. 
By 1427, Florentine wealth per capita was 30-40 per cent higher than in Italy in 1861 (Malanima 
2009). As Florentine merchants and bankers expanded their trade and perfected their art, the city 
grew in prominence. Florentine traders were invited to marketplaces, courts and palaces 
throughout the known world
13
. The most profitable industries in Florence quickly became wool 
and banking, and shrewd members of these guilds became as rich as kings (Stuard 2006). The 
richest citizens (who were without exception also prominent guild members) funded hospitals, 
churches, orphanages, and great works of art for the benefit of the popolo (Crum and Paoletti 
2006). These acts of patronage increased popular support for their benefactors, and were a 
mechanism by which guild members could translate economic wealth into political power.  
 The expansion of trade was also associated with an expansion of knowledge. Educational 
institutions and repositories of knowledge such as the Laurentian library were founded by 
wealthy citizens. Literacy increased in importance since the keeping of accurate records was so 
vital to managing a business, and teachers were paid directly by the guilds (Najemy 2004). 
                                                          
13
 The phrase “the known world” is imprecise and no offense or patronization is intended. In this context the term 
refers to the regions that were familiar to people in Florence. As Florentines became aware of new geographies, they 
generally sent traders and ambassadors to parlay and trade.  
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Florence scholarship today is greatly enhanced by the existence of abundant written records 
which still survive; thus the ability of modern scholars to study this era is a direct result of the 
influence that the guilds exerted on society. Florentine schools were especially pragmatic, 
preferring instruction in mathematics and humanism over classical Latin (ibid.). These schools 
taught students the skills they would need to be leaders in their guilds and in their communities. 
Florentine students were eager to learn a trade and participate in civic life. Saudi Arabian 
students do not expect the opportunities for advancement that Tuscan students enjoyed.    
 The fall of the grandi necessitated the development of new bonds to replace the medieval 
ties of ritual, identity, and ceremony (Becker 1968).  Horse races, parades, processions and new 
traditions all celebrated Florentine and Tuscan pride (Trexler 1991). The impact of human 
interaction was much stronger within this European region than elsewhere in the continent 
(Malanima 2009).  Florentines developed a tremendous civil society, which is the representation 
of a cohesive social environment. Citizens understood their role in society and could position 
their identity within several urban contexts.  
 Luxury wares had always augmented the medieval trade in staples, but this sector grew 
considerably beginning in the fourteenth century (Stuard 2006). The Florentine guilds began to 
respond to customer demand by increasing the variety of goods that they produced (ibid.). They 
also changed their retailing process to appeal to new urban demographics and encouraged 
consumption by emphasizing fashion. For many goods, “diversification, not specialization, was 
the rule” (ibid., 177). The number of products for personal and domestic use increased. Forks 
augmented traditional spoons and knives, goblets and glasses joined cups at the table, and 
impractically ornate capes and hats became more fashionable (ibid.). Within just a few 
generations, luxury goods which had been completely inaccessible to lower-class people 
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suddenly became widespread. Consumers purchased luxury goods under the assumption that 
they were repositories of value. They were seen as liquid assets, but were also valued as 
fashionable ornaments and reflections of wealth (ibid.). 
 Luxury goods helped men dress for success and move with confidence within wider 
circles of power and influence (Stuard 2006). Profits were of course concentrated among the 
wealthy, but fashion affected the lower classes as well.  In the city, the appearance of privately-
held wealth was so important to citizens of all classes that poorer citizens spent an increasing 
percentage of their income on goods that imitated the more expensive luxuries flaunted by the 
truly rich (ibid.). In an attempt to maintain distinction between classes, the wealthiest citizens 
responded by creating new fashions at an ever-increasing rate, since only they could afford to 
continually buy the newest and coolest designs and styles (ibid.). Visitors to Florence often failed 
to grasp the nuances of ever-changing patterns of fashion and consumption, but their general 
impression of the city was one of glamour, beauty and wealth. The Signoria fostered this 
perception with city planning measures designed to hide the poorest neighborhoods from the 
public eye (Crum and Paoletti 2006). Despite (indeed perhaps because of) constant economic 
pressure, the public reputation of the city was continually enhanced by an increase in art and 
luxury goods (Malanima 2009).  
 As the availability and quality of luxury goods increased, the lines between social classes 
began to blur
14
. Guilds reduced the power distance between the upper and lower classes. Nobles 
and non-nobles mingled in shops and social circles (Stuard 2006). If a craftsman of humble birth 
showed exceptional talent, his success brought prestige to his guild and wealth to his family 
                                                          
14
 Income inequality remained high even as civic involvement increased. In 1427, the richest 3000 families of 
Florence held more wealth than the remaining 57,000 households in all of Tuscany (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zubor, 
cited in Stuard 2006: 130).  
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(Stuard 2006). In this way, the guilds fostered a capacity to aspire (Pavan 2014) among all levels 
of Florentine society. In contract to a caste-based socioeconomic system, guilds offered a degree 
of social mobility. Poor Tuscan farmers could gain wealth and fame if they were diligent and 
lucky; indeed, the Medici were just one of the many Florentine families that leveraged personal 
wealth to obtain political power during this period. The Saud family currently enjoys both power 
and wealth, but their source of income will be threatened soon. Can they use their current wealth 
to influence social capital in a way which will ensure their continued power after their primary 
source of income is depleted? 
 
New Contexts and Institutional Transition 
   Yet Florence clearly began to lose its cultural and economic momentum over the course 
of the sixteenth century. Historians present five economic factors which combined to limit the 
longevity of the Florentine system. The first explanation points to Florence’s banking practices. 
Florentine Renaissance businesses were highly leveraged; some operated almost entirely on 
credit. This trend can reasonably be attributed to the social intimacy and generalized reciprocity 
fostered by the city’s guilds. Friendship and co-operation, not pure profit-seeking, encouraged 
many loans. This allowed businesses to continue to operate despite economic hardship, but 
eventually the whole economy became over-leveraged and collapsed (Padgett 2009). Whereas 
the Great Depression of 1929 was caused by over-speculation and unchecked optimism, the 
decline of the Florentine financial system can be seen as the result of too much emphasis on civic 
obligation at the expense of fiscal responsibility. The banking guild was one of the two most 
powerful guilds in the city, and its decay sent shockwaves throughout all aspects of Florentine 
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life. This illustrates the dangers in assuming concepts like social capital are universally beneficial 
in all contexts.  
 A second death blow to the Renaissance status quo was the rise in intercontinental sea 
trade. In 1492, Christopher Columbus introduced the existence of the Americas to Europeans. 
Six years later, Portuguese explorer Vasco de Gama mapped a naval route to India by sailing 
counterclockwise around Africa. The potential for profitable high-volume trade in new resources 
encouraged a shift in European economic focus from the Mediterranean to India and the 
Americas. Spain, Portugal, and England happened to be located closer to these new trade routes, 
and these nations built large, powerful ships to exploit and protect new long-distance trade. 
Spices and teas were new, exotic, and trendy, and as they increased in popularity throughout 
Europe, the arta della lana became much less profitable. Florence’s competitive advantage in the 
production of wool was outpaced by more productive production techniques in other nations 
(many of which were developed by foreign craftsmen desperate to compete with Florentine 
wool), and since up to 50% of the people of Florence were involved in some way in the wool 
trade, the decline in demand for luxury wool was a severe blow to the entire economy. The 
decline of the city’s two most powerful guilds destroyed the viability of the status quo. 
Specialization in one or two industries was beneficial while demand for those products was high, 
but the lack of economic diversification became problematic when the market for Florentine 
goods began to dry up. This is the problem which Saudi Arabia faces; its reliance on oil is 
beneficial when oil is profitable, but when external conditions reduce oil revenue, a backup plan 
is needed.  
 A third shock to the guilds was the rising cost of food caused by population growth. The 
Black Death had reduced urban demand for food, deflating prices and drawing people to the city. 
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Throughout the Renaissance, low agricultural production in Tuscany was not an economic 
constraint since citizens could afford to import a greater percentage of their foodstuffs from other 
regions. Nowhere else in Europe was the rate of urbanization over a relatively wide area as high 
as in the Italian peninsula (Malanima 2009). The city competed for pilgrims as it competed for 
trade, excluding only those who were part of mass movements that might endanger urban 
stability (Trexler 1991). As the population continued to grow, the rising costs of food began to 
constrict economic activity, and unrest among the poor grew along with the cost of food staples. 
Saudi Arabia’s domestic demand for water, electricity, and infrastructure is exploding with its 
urban population, and new methods must be developed to meet these needs in the future if Saudi 
Arabia is to remain a stable regional hegemon. 
 A fourth problem was the unsustainable level of conspicuous consumption. While luxury 
goods brought prestige to Florence, they tended also to be unproductive. This concept was 
explained by the American socioeconomics scholar Thorstein Veblen, and expensive but 
unproductive products are now called Veblen goods. As the appearance of wealth is associated 
with idleness, citizens concerned with their public image spent more and worked less.  The 
desire for fashion and status among Florentine citizens hampered domestic productivity even as 
the city’s wealth increased (Veblen 1899). Works of art, fine textiles, and sculptures are 
expensive to purchase but are intended for display. A fine woolen outfit, decorated with gold 
thread and silver buttons, might cost as much as a strong horse, but the horse could pull a plow. 
In the Kingdom, rentierism has resulted in a relatively unproductive society; name-brand 
electronics and flashy cars are valued more than less-expensive but practical goods. These high 
levels of conspicuous consumption will be unsustainable if Saudi society is forced to produce its 
own wealth instead of receiving financial assistance from the state.  
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  Tilly offers a fifth explanation addressing the extraction of wealth from a populace. As 
military technology advanced, the countries that had institutions better-suited for taxation used 
tax money to pay for giant ships, cannons and well-trained standing armies, and military might 
turned out to be more important than really nice silk hats. This created the necessity of 
economies of scale as military innovation promoted the promotion of large, expensive, well-
armed states (Tilly 1985). The republic, it turns out, wasn’t as good at adequately taxing citizens 
as monarchies were. The state needed to extract more wealth from citizens than guild leadership 
was willing to provide, so the needs of the state shifted to meet changing external security needs, 
and guild involvement in direct governance was replaced by a Duke that the Tuscans already 
trusted.  
 
Summary of Guild Effects in Florence 
 At any rate, the economic decline of the guilds coincided with a shift in political power 
from the Signoria as a whole to the Medici family. The Medici rose to power in Florence during 
the second half of the Renaissance in Florence, within the context of the socio-political turmoil 
discussed above. The Medici ran a shadow government in Florence; though they seldom held 
any official titles, Pope Pius II referred to Cosimo de Medici as “king in all but name” (Hibbert 
1985: 58-63). The Medici ruled in accordance with guild principles and served the needs of the 
popolo who gave them their power. In 1971, Christopher Hibbert calculated that Lorenzo de 
Medici spent the equivalent of $460 million of his family’s fortune on charitable works, libraries, 
churches, orphanages and works of art during his lifetime (Hibbert 1985). In 2015 dollars, that 
amount is over $2.5 billion. That is a staggering amount, made even more astounding given that 
most of it was spent within the commune of Tuscany. Florence at that time is estimated at around 
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70,000 people, and all of Tuscany had a population slightly over 100,000 - similar to the city of 
Boulder.  
 The people of Renaissance Florence remained devoted to the ideals of Republicanism 
through a century of de facto Medici rule from 1434 until the year 1531, when Alessandro de 
Medici was officially given the royal title of Duke of Florence and guild influence in government 
officially came to an end. By this time, the city’s guilds had begun to sink into decline, but once 
the Medici obtained a royal title and no longer had to contend with the pretense of republicanism, 
they began to institute ruinous restrictions on industry and personal freedom. The political 
history of Florence had come full circle: in the course of just over four centuries, the proud era of 
Florentine republicanism was at an end, and the region once again fell under the rule of titled 
royalty. The Medici, once the heroes of the republic fighting at the vanguard for the rights of the 
popolo, had themselves become grandi. The guilds became increasingly irrelevant in the 
changing conditions of the 17th and 18th centuries. Their fate was sealed in 1770 when a royal 
decree issued by the Grand Duke of Tuscany assigned their functions to a single Florentine 
Chamber of Commerce under complete control of the Grand Duke’s government. Just as Robert 
Michel described in 1911 with his “Iron Law of Oligarchy”, the institution of guild rule over 
time become displaced, wedded to routine, increasingly bureaucratic, and eventually absorbed 
into a new form of oligarchy.  
 Within the context of a Saudi comparison, the single most important factor guiding 
development in the Renaissance was the inherent political and cultural power that emerged from 
the social capital of the guilds. The guilds promoted participation in civic and political life, 
partially destratified society and strengthened a sense of community belonging. Guilds were the 
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dominant production institution of the era, and individual members of Florentine society acted on 
a daily basis within their social and economic context.  
 Yet the rise and fall of the guilds demonstrates a well-known fact in political science: no 
single type of government is objectively and universally the best. Guilds were the best choice for 
Florence within the context of the Renaissance, but their importance waned as internal and 
external conditions changed, eventually being adopted by a revised autocratic system (which 
itself, in turn, has experienced several evolutions between 1770 and the present). This 
demonstrates that institutions of governance must be suited to current internal and external 
conditions in order to be effective; institutions cannot be adopted wholesale by states and 
expected to function as they did in their native environments.  
 With that in mind, let’s take a look at modern-day Saudi Arabia and see if this 
comparison is useful. 
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Part Two: Modern Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabian society does not currently have the strong social capital which was evident 
in Florence. The institutions which the people on the Arabian Peninsula developed over centuries 
to respond to conditions to nomadic life in the desert environment have been largely rendered 
moot by recent policies of the Saud government. Social capital is detrimental to the Saudi policy 
of rentierism, thus institutions which foster civic, economic, and political participation among 
members of the general public are neglected or discouraged by the government. The sole 
exception, as previously noted, is the case of Wahhabism, which has grown in mutual 
dependence with the Saud regime. The Saud have thus far succeeded in extending their tenure as 
Kings by following this strategy, and have used oil wealth to increase standards of living and 
education among citizens. However, the effects of rentier policies have stunted the social capital 
of the Kingdom, and the populace is struggling to adapt traditional civic institutions and 
identities within this new state of affairs.  
 
Historical Arabian Society  
 Modern Saudi society was shaped by the conditions peculiar to the region. The 
Saud/Wahhab partnership has been shaping the way people interact with each other and with 
their government for over 250 years. Before that, the tenets of Islam and the unforgiving desert 
environment have shaped interactions across the Arabian Peninsula for over a thousand years. 
Though the observance of certain rituals, tenets and interactions change over time, both Saudi 
Arabia and Renaissance Florence operated within a rich, developed cultural atmosphere with 
over a thousand years of strong heritage shaping behavior and perceptions. It is of course a 
preposterous understatement to say that little of note occurred between 1200 and 1900 AD across 
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the Peninsula, but the general nature of intra-societal relations changed little within the 
atmosphere of Islamic observance. In Florence, too, society had well-established rules of social 
interaction, shaped in part by Catholicism, which were universally accepted and which began to 
be overturned during the Renaissance.  
 Between 1200 and 1900 AD, life on the Arabian Peninsula tended to be dominated by the 
interactions of two groups: the nomadic Bedouin tribes and the sedentary oasis dwellers. Though 
empires, kings, sultans and caliphs came and went, the importance of tribal identity remained 
relatively intact. Tribal and familial groups were the predominant institutions in the desert. Tribal 
relationships dictated trading partners, marriage candidacy, social hierarchies, and primary 
loyalties among both oasis dwellers and nomadic peoples. Social capital was shaped by tribal 
and family ties. Unlike the Florentine guilds, which were mutually dependent on one another, 
tribal relationships were chaotic, competitive and deeply intricate.  
 Arab society had thoroughly adapted to pastoral nomadism in the harsh dry steppes of the 
Arabian Peninsula. Every year, variable weather patterns resulted in different areas of the 
Peninsula becoming suitable for pastoral or agricultural exploitation. Both society and capital 
had to incorporate mobility in order to maximize the extraction of natural resources. The camel, 
perfectly adapted to this purpose, was a crucial part of life. In addition to providing sustenance 
and mobility, the camel also permitted the rise of “warrior nomads” who could threaten the 
settled oases and retreat into the obscurity of the desert (Mundy & Musallam 2000, 1-2).
15
 
Historic attempts by the public and academics to mimic this endemic Arabic diametric nomadic 
dynamic in static urban centers like Riyadh have proven problematic.
16
 
 
                                                          
15
 A modern Arab one-liner: “camel rustling was once the region’s official sport, until the Saud stole all the fun”.  
16
 Attempts to do so often result in vitriolic polemics. 
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Guild Analogues Among Sedentary Peoples of Arabia 
 Organizations similar to Florentine guilds have long existed on the Arabian Peninsula, 
but their importance has waxed and waned with the level of centralized governance in the region. 
 As trade throughout the Mediterranean increased during the Early Renaissance period, 
the under-governed region of Anatolia (present-day Turkey) experienced increased economic 
and cultural contact with Italian merchants. Understanding the benefits of cooperation, citizens in 
the region organized themselves into organizations known as akhi, which operated in a similar 
fashion to Florentine guilds (Durgun 2009). Akhi means brotherhood, referring to the union of 
traders or craftsmen. The akhi were locally-organized institutions which emphasized brotherhood, 
friendship, mutual aid and economic performance among members (ibid.). They set standards for 
occupational discipline, consumer protection, dispute resolution, financial assistance, and 
production standards. Like Italian guilds, they also incorporated local religious practices and 
social activities into their behavior (ibid.).  
  Yet the akhi arose in a different cultural setting, and so their behavior and effects were 
tailored to the conditions in Anatolia at the time. Recall that in Italy, guilds arose naturally from 
the social, political and economic conditions particular to that region and era. In time, they 
gained enough legitimacy to be codified into the legal framework and eventually incorporated 
into government directly. In Anatolia, the akhi arose from the conditions of political turmoil and 
decentralization that dominated the region in the 11th through 14th centuries. The region was at 
the time nominally under the control of the crumbling Byzantine Empire, which did not have the 
resources to administer it effectively. The Mongol invasions served the same gruesome function 
that the Black Death accomplished in Florence; large numbers of Turkish refugees fleeing 
westward through Iran settled in cities along the coast, resulting in a newly-urbanized society 
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desperate to protect their interests against proximal enemies in an under-governed region. In 
many coastal cities, the akhi grew as a form of de facto civil government in the absence of 
centralized authority. They became capable of enforcing laws, regulating imports and exports, 
and standardizing weights and measures (Durgun 2009). Due to the weak presence of the 
Byzantine government in the region
17
, the akhi arose to fill societal roles such as social welfare, 
local conflict resolution and trade negotiations with foreign governments. Over time, many of 
their practices spread inland and throughout the Middle East. 
 Members of the akhi tended to be petty merchants, tanners, bakers, and other tradesmen 
without the fantastic wealth and prestige of their Italian counterparts. Their location on the 
Mediterranean coast afforded them opportunities to build close ties to people from other cultures, 
and so the religious character of the akhi subscribed to a pragmatic, esoteric Islamic heterodoxy, 
and many considered themselves Sufi. They were also tolerant of other faiths, even allowing 
Jews and Christians to join their organizations (albeit with the tacit understanding that they 
would be converted to Islam eventually). Though the akhi grew in prestige and membership over 
the 12th and 13th centuries, their religious affiliations began to run afoul of the central Sunni 
orthodoxy. The power vacuum which allowed the akhi to thrive was also temporary. When the 
Ottoman Empire centralized power in the region around 1354 AD, the akhi were seen as a threat 
to the Sunni regime and were banned. Deprived of their legal rights, these organizations faded 
into obscurity (Durgun 2009). Thus the failure of akhi to thrive wasn’t due to any inherent 
institutional flaw, rather it could be viewed as the result of power consolidation within the 
religious-political establishment. Drawing again upon Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy, the duties 
                                                          
17
 The Byzantine and Ottoman Empires had such notoriously bloated government that today we refer to a paralyzing 
bureaucracy as “Byzantine”.  
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of these institutions were absorbed into a more centralized government and the aspects of their 
operation which were not essential to the new regime were discarded. 
 Though the akhi themselves did not survive, they had nonetheless shaped the societies in 
which they operated, and fragments of the economic and social functions of these institutions 
made their way into Arabian society in various forms (Yildirim 2006). The concept of gedik, for 
example, became a traditional way of economic self-management within individual cities 
throughout parts of the Ottoman Empire (Dünyas  & Meselesi 2010). Each city could only 
support a certain number of producers in any given industry, and so production developed a form 
of quasi-legal regulation. Gedik, or “slot” refers to the idea that market participation in a city was 
heritable. A craftsman’s gedik was his permission to participate in a certain industry, like 
weaving, oil production, or baking bread. A gedik was generally transferred from father to son, 
but could also be sold in case of severe economic hardship or relocation (ibid.). Another remnant 
of the akhi is the concept of futuwwa, meaning “chivalry” but the name also referred to social 
confraternities which operated in various poorly-documented capacities throughout parts of the 
Ottoman Empire from the 12th through 18th centuries. The futuwwa functioned similarly to the 
early Roman collegia, and as their name implies, they were primarily social organizations which 
tended to be segregated along lines of production. Much as guilds in Renaissance Florence arose 
to fill a society’s political needs after the nobility were ousted, the political influence of 
socioeconomic institutions similar to guilds grew during periods of decentralization on the 
Peninsula.  
 The Saud family first rose to royal might in 1744, when the leader of a relatively small 
clan with big dreams married his daughter to the son of a savvy religious philosopher named 
Wahhab. Saud offered Wahhab political protection and armed might, while Wahhab provided 
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religious legitimacy and the ideological foundations to support the Saud right to rule. That bond 
between umara and ulama (statesmen and divines) marks the modern inception of the use of 
religion as an instrument for both consolidating a collective identity and legitimizing the ruling 
family (Nevo 1998). Thus united, the two families carved out a portion of the Ottoman Empire 
larger than modern-day Saudi Arabia over the next several decades, but their rule was short-lived. 
Offending both Shia and Sunni sensibilities with their rapid expansion and new ideology, the 
Saud/Wahhab union ran afoul of the Ottoman Caliph, and the Saud were driven from power by 
the sword.  
 The power of the Saud family in the Peninsula waxed and waned until the 1920s, when 
Abdul Aziz bin Saud would again consolidate power, using a combination of luck, military 
acumen and the help of a religious warrior confraternity called the ikhwan to finally defeat the 
tattered remnants of the once-mighty Ottoman Empire. The new nation of Saudi Arabia was one 
of the poorest in the world, however, and the Saud did not have the resources to effect much 
change. For the vast majority of people within the geographic confines of the nascent Kingdom, 
nothing much changed under the new regime. Bedouin roamed the desert freely, oases remained 
largely independent and underdeveloped, and traditional tribal feuds persisted, with the Saud 
family exerting little influence over the landscape. 
 
Oil and the Rise of Rentierism 
 And then, in the late 1930s, everything began to change very quickly. The discovery of 
massive oil reserves was arguably the single most important event in the last thousand years of 
the Peninsula’s history. Since this time, Saudi society has undergone a radical transformation and 
much of the tension that the Kingdom is experiencing today is the result of the society struggling 
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to adapt to these new conditions. The system of social, economic and political interactions which 
had been in place for centuries was no longer suited to address the new problems of the Kingdom. 
The Saud monarchs have also been forced to adapt, and their tenure is evidence of their 
considerable proficiency in this arena. They have resorted to wholehearted rentierism, a tactic 
which was only barely visible in the final decades of the Renaissance.  
 Early Renaissance Florence demonstrated the benefits of a society focused on economic 
efficiency. The ability of middle-class Florentine citizens to earn fabulous amounts of wealth 
through savvy business enterprises fostered a tremendous capacity to aspire in Florentine citizens. 
You will recall that as early as the 1330s some 50% of Tuscan citizens were involved in some 
aspect of the textiles business, despite the majority not enjoying guild membership and thus 
having no part in government. Social capital was high because of economic activity and vice 
versa. The government nurtured the community because it had economic incentives to do so.  
 Rentierism, on the other hand, develops very differently. Rentierism is a national 
economic strategy in which a government seeks to maximize its revenue from a single resource 
(in this case, oil) and distributes the proceeds among various sections of the population (Ramady 
2010). In a rentier state, a large amount of wealth can be generated with a very small part of the 
population. Since the majority of the people don’t need to be involved in the process whatsoever, 
the state can use its deep pockets to buy the loyalty of a populace without encouraging their 
participation.  
 The discovery of oil was initially a windfall for the Saud. Besides attracting the attention 
of powerful allies interested in the resource’s strategic value during the Second World War, the 
presence of oil made the Saud immediately and immensely wealthy. The state didn’t need to rely 
as heavily on strong social connections, and with the money to build lavish palaces there was 
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reason to settle down. The only institutions that were important to the Saud were those that 
related to the extraction and sale of oil and responsible management of those profits. Thus banks 
and oil corporations became the two most developed aspects of the Saudi Arabian economic 
strategy. Unfortunately, neither of these industries are capable of gainfully employing a 
workforce of 20 million unemployed and increasingly restless Saudi citizens. 
 It makes sense that, upon taking power, the Saud should consolidate their holdings and 
begin making their Kingdom easier to rule. Again citing Tilly:  
With respect to state making (in the narrow sense of eliminating or neutralizing the local 
rivals of the people who controlled the state), a territory populated by great landlords or 
by distinct religious groups generally imposed larger costs on a conqueror than one of 
fragmented power or homogeneous culture” (1985, 182).  
Smaller city-states in Renaissance Europe had the advantage of being more homogeneous, more 
physically accessible, and thus easier to govern. In modern times, however, geographic size is 
easier to maintain as long as citizens can be tracked. The Saud had to be careful to keep an eye 
on any potential rivals, and they did this by encouraging unprecedented urbanization in the 
Kingdom. This, to an extent, negated traditional identities and fragmented potential opposition 
by breaking traditional social institutions. When King Abdul Aziz formed the modern Saudi 
State in 1932, the majority of their citizens lived in rural areas (Pavan 2014), but they 
immediately set about changing that. Roughly 49% of the total population was urbanized as early 
as 1970, and 12% of the population was living in cities with a population of 1 million or more. 
By 2005, the percentage living in cities was 83%, with 35% of the population living in cities of 1 
million or more (Ramady 2010). The new urban landscape is easier to govern, but the transition 
from a pastoral society to an urban one has had dramatic consequences for society. 
 Saudi society is in a state of flux, with many millions of citizens struggling to redefine 
their identities within this new urban environment. The anticipation of civic participation or 
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sense of social belonging that new arrivals to Florence could expect are not part of the 
experience of newly-urbanized Saudi Arabians. They have little expectation of shaping their 
communities, and government welfare programs foster no capacity to aspire (Pavan 2014) 
among the new arrivals or the Kingdom’s youth. Huntington would describe this as a “society 
without community” (1968, 8). He elaborates: 
In a society of any complexity, the relative power of each group is exercised through 
political institutions which temper, moderate, and redirect that power so as to render the 
dominance of one social force compatible with the community of many. (1968, 8) 
 
 Rentierism therefore stands as the primary obstacle to reforming Saudi society to foster 
the development of institutions that encourage civic participation. The existence of a rentier state 
helps to conserve socio-political norms in Arab societies and polities such as the patrimonial 
nature of social interactions and primordial loyalties (Ross 2001). While these norms were well-
suited to the nomadic lifestyle which previously dominated society on the Arabian Peninsula, 
within the modern urban environment they are no longer productive. Rentierism discourages an 
efficient private sector outside of oil and finance within the Kingdom and contributes to sluggish 
public sector performance. Though technically an economic policy, rentierism affects every 
aspect of life in Saudi Arabia, including politics, society, religion, and education. The traditional 
aspects of human interaction, including remnants of akhi which remained in Arabia until the 
1800s, have withered.  
 
Attempts to Compensate for New Conditions 
 Though shared oil wealth has raised the standard of living (measured by Western metrics) 
for most Saudi citizens, it has had some problematic consequences. The Kingdom has been 
attempting to shift from its dependence on oil for decades, with some success, though its 
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initiatives have generally neglected the development of productive social capital among its 
citizens until the last fifteen years or so. Since the turn of the 21st Century, Saudi rulers have 
begun to re-evaluate the sustainability of rentierism and have implemented a number of 
programs and initiatives to better address the Kingdom’s increasing need for social capital in 
coming decades. 
 Realizing the limitations of oil reliance, in the 1970s the Saud initially attempted an 
economic growth strategy based on import substitution. The plan was to locally produce 
consumer goods that were previously imported from Asia and Europe, thus keeping capital 
inside the Kingdom and creating jobs for local Saudi workers and merchants. This failed for two 
reasons: lobbying from the Saudi merchant class, and lack of expertise among local Saudi 
citizens. Import substitution required substantial tariffs if domestic goods were to compete with 
lower-cost and higher-quality imports. Economic protectionism is detrimental to importers. A 
small number of large Saudi merchant families (each with several hundred members) virtually 
controlled the import and export of non-petroleum products in the Kingdom. They effectively 
lobbied senior princes and the King to preserve their privileges (Seznec & Kirk 2010). 
Additionally, the Saudi education system, with its emphasis on religious studies, had not 
adequately prepared a sufficient portion of the population to produce advanced goods at low 
prices. The lack of social capital presented obstacles in anticipating supply and demand for 
various goods. 
 One additional consequence of the Saudi rentier economy has been the development of a 
powerful state bureaucracy which has perpetuated a preference for government jobs at the 
expense of the private sector. Since the majority of profitable economic activity in the Kingdom 
comes from oil revenue and the Kingdom does not currently tax its citizens directly, the private 
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sector has developed a subservient relationship to the public sector (Ramady 2010).  Public 
sector jobs, though popular among citizens, tend to be focused around the state’s operations as a 
redistributive agent and offer few merit-based advancement incentives, thus depriving ambitious 
public servants of a sense of fulfillment for a job well done. Senior civil servants demonstrate 
deficiencies in “psychological drive, flexibility, communication, client relations and impartiality” 
(Hegelan and Palmer 1999; Ramady 201, 20). In Hertog’s words, the Saudi state operates on a 
“wide array of very different, parallel client bodies that have not been functionally integrated and 
in some cases constituted veritable worlds unto themselves” (Hertog 2010, 249). This allows for 
islands of administrative efficiency in banking and oil-related sectors while effectively 
paralyzing many others such as public safety, justice, and infrastructure. 
 The composition of the private sector is one of the biggest obstacles to modern Saudi 
Arabian development. Today, as many as 95 percent of private sector jobs are filled by foreign 
workers, though expatriates comprise only one-third of the Kingdom’s estimated population of 
28.8 million (Seznec & Kirk 2010).
18
 These expatriates drain billions of dollars from the Saudi 
economy annually in the form of remittances sent to families abroad.
19
 This is not too much of a 
problem when oil rents are high, but as the price of oil drops (as it has recently) it quickly 
becomes an issue that cannot be ignored (Seznec 2010). Efforts to encourage Saudi businessmen 
to hire local citizens are met with resistance by employers who are disinclined to hire more 
expensive domestic employees (ibid.). Saudi citizens, in turn, feel no pressing desire to replace 
expatriates in these jobs, which tend to be unskilled labor and are seen as undesirable. The 
remaining 5 percent of private sector jobs, then, are thinly distributed among the remaining 19 
                                                          
18
 Despite efforts by the government to enact measures to facilitate keeping track of citizens, demographic estimates 
for the Kingdom tend to vary wildly. Another source places the 2014 population of the Kingdom at 25 million, with 
expatriates comprising 5 million of that number (Maisel 2014).  
19
 Ramady estimates the total amount of remittances sent abroad between 1970 and 2008 at $327 billion in 2010 
dollars (2010: 31).  
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million Saudi citizens. To a degree that is difficult to conceptualize, the extent of the rentier state 
in Saudi Arabia has fostered “a nation of beggars” (House 2012, 25). In the event that rentier 
policies are discontinued, the people of Saudi Arabia have little productive capacity which they 
can leverage to maintain their current levels of consumption.  
 
Family Solidarity and Wasta 
 Family and tribal solidarity remains the primary social institution within Saudi Arabia. 
An overwhelming majority of jobs which are available and desirable to Saudi citizens are 
allocated using a form of patronage called wasta, or “intercession”. This term refers to family or 
social connections, and it is not dissimilar to the western concept of social ‘clout’ (Cunningham 
& Sarayrah 1994, 29). Saudi society, unlike that of Renaissance Florence, is deeply fragmented 
and rule of law is not prevalent. Often, in order to conduct business, Saudi citizens must leverage 
personal connections, favors and bribes to gain the favor of an influential official who can 
facilitate business transactions like the purchase of land, obtaining a business license or loan, the 
clearance of a shipment of goods through customs, or the bestowal of lucrative government 
contracts. Steffen Hertog explains: 
 Ever since the creation of modern bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia, princes and the 
commoners around them have been linked through patron–client relations: long-term, 
deep and unequal links of fealty. Royals provide access to power, resources and status, 
whereas the commoners provide loyalty and defend the interests of their patrons in state 
and society. These ties have been keeping elites with seemingly divergent interests – 
princes and technocrats – tightly knit together for more than half a century. In their 
diversity, these links are reaching deep into the state apparatus. As sticky as they tend to 
be in Saudi Arabia, however, they are seldom simple ‘dyads’, but rather part of more 
complex networks of patronage in which clients themselves are patrons for actors further 
down in the hierarchy, clients can have several patrons, and links can shift over time, 
changing their utility as the context changes. (Hertog 2008, 647) 
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 Wasta is a reciprocal agreement; favors in exchange for loyalty. It is a vital feature of the 
Saudi economy, yet like the production of art in Renaissance Florence, one which is virtually 
impossible for scholars to objectively quantify. Where the early Florentine guilds tended to lean 
toward meritocratic promotion, the bureaucratic Saudi public sector is handicapped by the fact 
that individual employees seldom need to be efficient. 
 Florentine citizens living in the closing decades of the Renaissance would recognize the 
concept of wasta. The Medici ruled from behind the scenes as Florence’s “Big Men”, conferring 
offices as favors instead of as the due reward for tax-paying citizens (Brown 2011: xvi). Bankers 
extended credit to insolvent friends and relatives at discounted rates with the expectation of 
future reciprocity. Though a certain amount of generalized reciprocity is associated with 
economic growth, if the expectation of further extended credit reduces the cost of failure to close 
to zero, then individual citizens have little incentive to succeed. Wasta and rentierism have the 
effect of reducing a community’s capacity to aspire (Pavan 2014) and incentivizing the 
application of the bare minimum of exertion in business undertakings. This dynamic also helps 
to explain the continued importance of honor and social standing in a society that has undergone 
drastic changes in the last three generations (House 2012, 63). Since jobs are allocated based on 
wasta, and wasta is based on reputation, ambitious newly-urbanized Saudi citizens have no 
choice but to participate in consumerism if they wish to participate in the labor market. They 
purchase name brand clothing, accessories, and cars to give the appearance of success in order to 
impress friends and relatives, thus becoming eligible for the job that might make them successful.  
 The conspicuous consumption of Veblin goods is comparable to the Renaissance taste for 
fine art, but Saudi society, unlike Florentine society, is not broadly involved in the production of 
the wealth which pays for these goods. Florentine citizens worked together to build individual 
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wealth, and wealthy patrons nurtured the growth of social capital, returning a portion of that 
wealth to the people in the form of welfare, charity, and public works. The participation of a 
large segment of society was vital to the Medici; their wealth was contingent on the city’s social 
capital. In Saudi Arabia, wealth is generated independent of the majority of the population, and 
this wealth is distributed to society at large.  
 Each system has benefits and drawbacks, and so are suited to different situations. The 
Medici had a close connection with the people of Florence.
20
 The guilds fostered transparency 
and accountability since individual performance was linked to the economic wealth of others and 
social capital was paramount. The Saud are able to veil a majority of their actions from the 
public eye since the people aren’t the source of their power. The Kingdom has little 
accountability and transparency in its actions, which discourages public participation in political 
discussions (Alastair Hirst cited in Seznec & Kirk 2010, 10). The Saud system widens the gulf 
between political and social life, fostering a deep conventional respect for authority which is 
already present in paternalistic Arabian society. Wahhabism has been carefully cultivated to 
foster this submissive tendency (even the word Islam means submission). An ingrained culture of 
public politeness and a distaste for public confrontation further decreases the accountability of 
the Saud to the people by raising the threshold for open protest in the event of public discontent.  
 
  
                                                          
20
 Lorenzo de Medici once wrote in a narrative poem “...I was approaching town along the road that leads into the 
portal of Faenza, when I observed such throngs proceeding through the streets, that I won't even dare to guess how 
many men made up the retinue. The names of many I could easily say: I knew a number of them personally...There's 
one I saw among those myriads, with whom I'd been close friends for many years, as I had known him since we'd 
both been lads..."  ("Il Simposio," qtd. in Miles J. Unger's "Magnifico: The Brilliant Life and Violent Times of 
Lorenzo de' Medici." New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.) 
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Part Three: The Kingdom’s Future 
 
 Rentierism currently stands as the primary obstacle to reforming Saudi society to foster 
the development of institutions that encourage civic participation. The existence of a rentier state 
helps to conserve socio-political norms such as the patrimonial nature of social interactions and 
primordial loyalties (Ross 2001). Rentierism discourages an efficient private sector outside of oil 
and finance within the Kingdom and contributes to sluggish public sector performance. It is also 
incompatible with high levels of social capital growth. Can the fissures in a deeply fragmented 
Saudi society be bridged by some variation of a latter-day guild? Can the traditions of weak 
political and civic participation in Saudi Arabia be overcome? Most importantly, if it can be done, 
what is the result to those currently in power? 
 
Looking Forward 
 Saudi Arabia is aware that its petroleum reserves will not sustain economic growth 
forever. A priority of the Saudi monarchy is “empowering the private sector to become the 
engine of growth through meaningful Saudi national job creation and exports” (Ramady 2010). 
The key to creating sustainable growth through social institutions lies in cultivating a capacity to 
aspire (Pavel 2014) among the Saudi population. Guilds in Renaissance Europe fostered “the 
construction of a great social and moral machine, calculated to produce wealth, knowledge, and 
happiness, with unprecedented precision and rapidity” (Black 1984, 177). Every member of 
society was a cog in this machine, and each individual could benefit from the system’s triumphs. 
Saudi development has led its people in the opposite direction, and this strategy has been 
effective in maintain Saud control over the region so far, despite high levels of volatility in the 
region in recent decades. But signs currently point to a decline in the Kingdom’s ability to 
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sustain rentierism, and though the Saud have been successful so far, they will soon find 
themselves presented with a new set of challenges in which their current strategies will be 
counterproductive.  
 Why should the King of Saudi Arabia consider guilds as a basis for guiding social 
policies? Upon consolidating power, the Medici tended to rule from behind the scenes, seldom 
holding elected office personally. Yet the city-state remained a nominal republic
21
 until the end 
of the Renaissance. The people supported Medici rule because of the family’s popular reputation, 
eventually going so far as to support the bestowal of the Medici title of Duke despite the city-
state’s long history as a republic. During the upheaval which may occur in Saudi Arabia during 
the 21st Century decline of rentierism, the shape that the government will take is uncertain. But 
if aspects of the Florentine experience can be adopted by  Saudi Arabia during this transition, 
then the new shape which the society selects to rule over it need not necessarily exclude the 
continued primacy of the Saud dynasty.  
 A rentier economy requires vast amounts of wealth independent of the majority of the 
population. This money is used to provide the people enough services to keep them content. The 
Saud have subsidized many public services within the Kingdom in an effort to keep costs down 
and prevent social unrest. For example, the prices of fuels, electricity, and desalinated water in 
Saudi Arabia are just a fraction of their market values. Proponents of subsidies argue that they 
shield the population against price fluctuations, ensure that the poor have access to electricity 
and fuel, distribute hydrocarbon wealth, and buy domestic political support (Bahgat 2013). This 
is true, but they are also fantastically expensive and thus untenable in the long term.  
                                                          
21
 Even Medici rule was not constant; family members were exiled from Florence on no fewer than four occasions 
between 1400 and 1537. For a majority of Florentine citizens, exile was almost as severe a punishment as death, 
since it meant the loss of their social identity which they held very dear. Luckily for the Medici, their exiles were 
rescinded when things quieted down. 
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 Tilly explains how, beginning at the end of the Renaissance, European absolutist 
monarchs were increasingly forced by military necessity to extend rights of representation in 
government to those sectors capable of paying the taxes necessary to fund the needs of the state 
(Tilly 1990).
22
 In Tilly’s model, a transition necessitated increased military expenditures which 
led to the development of social capital in order to better extract wealth from a society. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, the factor spurring growth is likely to be not war, but the fall of rentierism. 
But the result is the same: Saudi Arabia will need to greatly improve its ability to extract wealth 
from its populace in coming decades.  
 It is thus advantageous to the Saud dynasty to foster private sector economic activity and 
institutions. These institutions, similar in operation to the guilds, can be relegated a certain 
amount of economic protection and independence, much as the Florentine guilds were. By 
granting these institutions a measure of freedom to shape their own operations, the Saud can 
begin to build the foundations of a society without rentierism. An increase in civic participation 
in economic and social spheres will encourage the growth of social capital, and the people can 
leverage this to increase productivity to meet the falling profitability of the oil sector. This might 
have the added benefit of allowing the Saud to use these institutions as a blame avoidance 
measure if necessary, shifting blame to the private sector to protect the dynasty in the event of 
economic underperformance. This may serve the purpose of extending Saud tenure in the context 
of increasing levels of public economic independence. Finally, institutions which nurture social 
capital will also facilitate the creation of civic identity among Saudi citizens, strengthening social 
                                                          
22
 The possibility of war has been omitted from this essay because of the inherent difficulty in predicting future 
international armed conflicts. In an unpublished draft paper from 2004, Rolf Schwartz explains the difference 
between “empirical” states which fit Tilly’s criteria for development in the face of military threats, and “quasi-states” 
which generally were created or gained independence in the 20th century after national boundaries were largely 
given and thus developed different ways of resource extraction, such as rentierism. He concludes that that the level 
of rentierism is a better indicator for the path state-formation has taken in the Arab Middle East than a focus on the 
war-making capacities of states. 
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networks and expanding reciprocity while assisting in the formation of individual identities 
which are more relevant under the Kingdom’s current conditions.  
   
Obstacles to Immediate Change 
 Though the Kingdom has been making steps to reform his economy to satisfy both 
international organizations and domestic demands, many obstacles prevent modern Saudi leaders 
from superimposing Florentine guild socioeconomic institutional organization into their own 
society. Firstly, cultural paradigms of leadership and governance vary across societies. 
Participatory leadership is traditionally valued in cultures with European influence, and 
Renaissance Italy was no exception. Newcomers to the Florentine political scene arrived with an 
expectation of political participation and civic involvement. Saudi society, on the other hand, has 
a long tradition of deference to authority dating back to the formation of Islam (which itself 
means submission). Saudi Arabia does not share Florence’s tradition of political and civic 
participation. Citizens in Arab nations tend to prize authoritarian management practices in a 
combination of family or tribal norms and bureaucratic organizational structure (Wolf 2006). 
Acceptable management practices found in one country are not guaranteed to work even in a 
neighboring country (Hofstede 2001); can one expect them to be comparable across seven 
hundred years of technological advances and cultural divergence? In addition, Arabs are aware 
of the encroachment of Western influence in their society, and tend to be suspicious of 
institutions which they perceive to be Western in origin because these institutions do not tend to 
suit the needs of Arabia. Guilds arose in Florence under conditions which do not exist in Saudi 
Arabia, and might not serve the interests of either the people or the Saud if they did. 
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 Secondly, the Saud family has now grown so large that the prospect of consensus among 
the Saud princes is becoming a pipe dream. Historically, institutional change within the 
Kingdom tends to reflect power shifts among a select few princes and technocrats rather than a 
unified Saud strategy (Hertog 2008). The fractures in society and tenuous alliances based on 
wasta are not limited to the general population; the ruling family is also divided, fractious and 
bureaucratic. Saudi development from the 1970s up until now has not been the result of carefully 
considered long-term strategy. “How these different institutions evolved, and which ones 
emerged on top, was not predetermined. In the absence of powerful political forces outside of the 
regime core, it rather was contingent on the quirks of a small section in the Saudi elite – their 
personalities, their patronage relations and their more or less petty conflicts” (Hertog 2008, 661).  
 This relates to the third problem, the fact that relatively minor decisions made today often 
have major consequences down the road. An analysis of the Saud society today isn’t necessarily 
a useful indicator of how its people will react to changing conditions in the future. In many 
groups, the actual history of experiences may not be indicative of an unambiguous social 
paradigm (Schein 2010). Culture cannot be inferred from behavior, and behavior is not 
necessarily demonstrative of culture (Schein 2010, 20). Unanticipated external shocks are often 
capable of influencing a nation’s development in ways which appear to directly contradict 
external understanding of local cultural paradigms. The developments of the Arab Spring could 
scarcely have been forecast 20 years before they took place because the effects of the 
introduction of social media in the Arab world could not have been predicted. In other words, 
political science tends to be more of a descriptive discipline than a prescriptive tool. There are so 
many factors which might influence the success or failure of a particular strategy that it is 
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difficult to make a confident recommendation, especially regarding a society decades into the 
future.  
 In order to guide societal change, it seems that the Saud must give its people something 
to work towards; a goal which can only be achieved through cooperation. A war would serve this 
function; if the Saud encouraged its people to unify against a common foe who presented a clear 
and present danger to the existence of the state, it could conceivably accomplish this task in a 
few short years. Wars, however, also have undesirable and unpredictable effects, and though 
they can drastically alter the shape of a state’s development for better or worse, war is outside the 
scope of this essay. A slower but more reliable method of supplying a common goal to the 
people of Saudi Arabia would be the transition to social and economic participation. While 
rentierism remains viable, the Saud would be advised to subsidize the formation of institutions 
which promote the growth of social capital. These can be economic institutions like guilds, but 
other organizations are also capable of building social capital. In an economic example, the 
subsidies would make participation in these ventures highly profitable, encouraging participation. 
In non-economic institutions such those which are tribal, religious, or educational in nature, 
government subsidies can nonetheless encourage activities, norms, and interactions which build 
social capital, such as government sponsorship of intra-tribal camel races, academic competitions, 
or community centers. 
 The Saud have always been careful to implement social reforms gradually. As aspects of 
guilds changed over time to meet the changing needs of the people, perhaps institutions already 
in Saudi Arabia could be adapted to accomplish the task of building social capital. Three 
organizations within the Kingdom appear to possess both the motive and the means to build 
social capital in the new Saudi Arabia. The first is the highly-developed industrial export sector, 
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which shares the Florentine guild aspect of being primarily an economic institution. The second 
is the Wahhabist movement, which has the advantage of the participation of a large portion of 
Saudi society. The third is the traditional tribal ties which are being redefined in the new urban 
environment. Each of these institutions has developed advantages and drawbacks in terms of 
social capital generation, and in the last decade the Saud have targeted each of these entities for 
significant reform. 
 
The Case for Industry  
 First, let’s look at industry. Modern Saudi state-owned companies tend to be extremely 
efficient and relatively immune to corruption. The largest, Saudi Aramco, was originally an 
American company which transitioned to a Saudi state-owned company in the 1970s, leaving the 
western-style corporate management infrastructure largely intact. Large state-owned companies 
like Aramco, SABIC and Ma’aden are therefore largely immune to the financially-problematic 
tradition of wasta (Hertog 2008). Their huge profit margins permit them to hire and train 
professional employees, develop their own technology and infrastructure, and develop a 
meritocratic management system (Seznec and Kirk 2010). State-owned companies in the Gulf 
may be the fundamental engine of development. This meritocratic framework could be applied to 
a number of other countries with similar success, “although the lack of corruption and the 
meritocratic management system may be difficult to implement elsewhere” (Seznec and Kirk 
2010: 10). 
 Hertog proposes a new development structure linking large state-owned companies. The 
Saudi banking system today is one of the most capitalized, liquid and profitable in the world 
(Ramady 2010). A parallel to Florentine economy is clear, even if the two cases developed from 
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different conditions. Florentine Renaissance banks were successful due to a tightly-knit guild 
social structure, developed over centuries, which hinged on personal relationships with foreign 
royalty, disseminated best business practices, and arose from a tradition of meticulous record-
keeping. Saudi banks, on the other hand, are productive today because of the necessity of the 
Saudi economy to maximize its staggering oil profits.  
 Saudi industry appears at first glance to operate similarly in many ways to the arta della 
lana. Take the petroleum behemoth, Aramco, as an example. Aramco operates as a “kingdom 
within a kingdom” (Hertog 2008). The company funds its own educational institutions, is 
permitted to make and enforce its own laws to an extent, and its isolated corporate compounds 
provide all the social amenities its employees desire.  Since the Saud regime relies almost 
exclusively on the profitability of the oil industry for its budget, Aramco, much like the arta 
della lana, is able to influence Saud politics in realms with economic consequences. A young 
aspiring Florentine immigrant had a variety of trade opportunities to select from, but eager Saudi 
citizens are very limited in their career choices. In Florence, guild members lived and worked 
with citizens from all walks of life and built social capital with members of various social groups. 
Saudi Arabians employed by Aramco generally live in fenced-in corporate compounds and live 
in relative isolation from the bulk of Saudi society. Since Aramco is the best opportunity for 
aspiring young people, other sectors suffer a “brain drain” as the most capable employees are 
snatched up and isolated.  
 But to what extent can Aramco shape the whole of Saudi society throughout the 21st 
century? The most significant obstacle is associated with rentierism and the fact that 
participation in the petroleum industry is limited. Saudi Arabia has an obvious comparative 
advantage in the production of petroleum, but the institutions for the extraction and production of 
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this resource were intentionally designed by American investors to be independent from the bulk 
of Saudi society (Hertog 2008). While the Florentine guilds shaped a society that operated in 
close partnership with the government, the finance and petroleum industries were designed to 
exclude the Saudi people to the greatest extent possible.  
 Hertog asserts that “the preservation of Aramco’s American managerial structures would 
not have been thinkable in a nationalistic political environment” (Hertog 2008: 662). Any 
attempts to expand the oil industry to a greater percentage of the Saudi population will result in 
the dilution of its meritocracy, thereby decreasing its efficiency and depriving the Kingdom of its 
most important source of income. But Hertog also argues that linking large Saudi corporations to 
diversified economic development will also introduce the populace to the effective meritocratic 
business methods employed by these large firms.  
 Also, since one of our initial assumptions was that falling oil profits will contribute to 
political instability, it stands to reason that if the status quo is maintained then Aramco will begin 
to shrink even as Saudi society begins to roil. But Aramco has little incentive to dilute its profits, 
paying a greater percentage of Saudi society to participate in a shrinking petroleum industry. As 
a public company, Aramco is interested in the financial bottom line. The other corporations 
within the Kingdom are mostly ruled by Saudi Princes and a small number of oligarchic 
merchant families with whom the Saud have reciprocal wasta arrangements; favors in exchange 
for loyalty. Private enterprise and small business, like the bulk of Saudi society, can be 
conveniently ignored until it starts causing trouble.  
 Small private enterprise within the Kingdom, as mentioned before, suffers from a lack of 
support by the government. Since Saudi Arabia’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 
2005, an increasing number of Saudi citizens have begun expanding into entrepreneurial 
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ventures, but the bureaucracy has been slow to implement comprehensive regulations that would 
facilitate entry of new small businesses into the marketplace (Alharbi 2014). Despite obstacles, 
membership in the WTO brings pressure from the international community for the Kingdom to 
develop protections for private enterprise, small business, and social capital.  
 It is fallacious to assume that the shortcomings of the Kingdom’s current institutions are 
the result of some deficiency in Arabic or Muslim culture. The Ministries of Finance, Labor, and 
Oil have developed efficient training techniques in the fields which are vital for the Kingdom’s 
development. In short, the lack of public sector participation by Saudi citizens isn’t due to any 
inherent inadequacy among Saudi citizens; it is because public sector participation has not been a 
priority within the Saudi rentier system, so it has been neglected by the government. In the last 
couple decades, the Saud have begun to implement programs to increase the participation of its 
citizens in local labor markets. This process is nicknamed “Saudization” and it is an attempt by 
the regime to increase the Kingdom’s social capital by encouraging citizens to participate in 
economic activity. The program, known as Nitaqat, “aims to offer job opportunities to Saudi 
nationals and demands that companies operating in the Kingdom hire a certain number of Saudi 
employees to be determined in accordance with the company’s size” (Mustafa 2013, 1). The 
initiative has grown by kicks and starts, but has growing support among the populace, especially 
young Saudis eager to join the workforce. If the program is successful, it will build social capital 
among the Kingdom’s youth. This in turn will increase their productivity, help to develop civic 
identity, encourage a capacity to aspire, and make them generally more content, fulfilled, and 
less likely to demand regime change as state welfare benefits decline. The program faces 
criticism for aspects of its performance (ibid.), yet as time progresses and rentierism becomes 
less viable, the program will likely begin to attract more participants. This is one example of a 
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societal shift that may occur as the result of changing economic conditions, and the Saud appear 
to be aware of the benefits of addressing the needs of the Kingdom’s youth. 
 In fact in 2013 the Kingdom began funding one of the largest vocational and technical 
education upgrades in the world. The capacity of the system will be increased from 110,000 
students to more than 220,000 students by 2020, and the Kingdom continues to augment the 
system to meet local conditions (Pavel 2014). To bypass the obstacles in the Saudi bureaucracy, 
the Kingdom contracted with a number of international corporations to provide oversight, 
planning, and regulation. Vocational training facilities in ten cities will be independently run by 
international providers and regulated, funded and overseen by the Kingdom’s Technical and 
Vocational Education Training (TVET) system. By 2020, the initiative will have provided 
technical and vocational training to nearly half a million students at a cost of $3.65 billion to the 
Kingdom (ibid.). Once the project is running smoothly, Saudi Arabia expects to reduce the 
international presence and will transition its operations to domestic institutions. In other words, 
the Kingdom appears to have recognized its own administrative shortcomings and is enlisting the 
help of UK and US corporations to design sustainable institutions which are tailored to the 
current and future needs of Saudi Arabia.  
 A total of thirty-seven new vocational colleges, called “Colleges of Excellence”, have 
begun training students within the last two years. In 1970 there were only three universities in 
the Kingdom. Today there are nine private and twenty-eight public universities, with ten more 
planned to open in the next five years (Pavel 2014). To fund these and other education reforms, 
the Ministry of Finance approved a record-breaking $228 billion education budget in 2014 (ibid.). 
The King Abdulluh Scholarship Program is one of the largest scholarship foundations in the 
world, currently funding or subsidizing the studies of over 110,000 Saudi students at universities 
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around the world. So many young Saudi citizens are taking advantage of this program that Saudi 
Arabian Airlines has inaugurated at least two new flight destinations to transport students (ibid.).  
 Perhaps most exciting, at least from the perspective of this essay, is a contract signed in 
2014 with a British company called “City and Guilds” which specializes in expanding the social 
capital associated with economic activity in small businesses (City & Guilds 2014). This 
company is sending teams all over Saudi Arabia to evaluate how best to promote the growth of 
institutions which will connect businesses with communities to meet the needs of citizens.  
 Advances in education, training, and infrastructure are moot if jobs remain unavailable. 
Thus the Kingdom also is taking steps to create jobs using the Kingdom’s comparative 
advantages to expand economic activity outside the export of unrefined petroleum. Cheap energy 
positions the Kingdom to become the largest and cheapest producer of chemicals in the world 
within a few years due to the reliance of this industry on inexpensive energy and abundant 
capital (Seznec and Kirk 2010). Aramco has stated it will invest more heavily in new domestic 
refineries which will be staffed primarily by Saudi nationals. The smaller corporations run by 
Princes are learning ways to increase productivity among their employees as the increasing size 
of the Saud family spreads the Princely allowance a little too thin and the profitability of 
business becomes increasingly important. As businesses become more professional and 
successful, they hire new employees who experience a renewed capacity to aspire. Social capital 
will increase the productivity of these businesses by allowing owners to better anticipate supply 
and demand (Darley & Khizindar 2015), increasing reciprocity and profitability. Many of these 
employees will break out and start their own small businesses, and as rentierism declines, the 
private sector can grow to offset a portion of the economic shock to the people.  
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 With more money at stake and in the context of international pressure, Saudi businesses 
are already pushing for judicial reform in order to protect their assets (The Economist 2009). 
Women, currently comprising some 60% of students at the Kingdom’s universities, could soon 
enjoy greater legal protections, enabling the economy to benefit from this largely-untapped 
source of productivity. This will have second- and third-order effects as well, which will need to 
be considered.
24
 Social networking will develop among small business owners eager to share 
best practices.
25
 Ripples like these will spread through every aspect of Saudi life, and changes in 
other areas will flow into the economic realm. 
 
The Case for Wahhabism: 
 Wahhabism has several advantages that appear to position it nicely to encourage the 
growth of social capital. Most importantly, the Islamic faith offers a pre-existing social 
framework which includes virtually all members of Saudi society (adherence to Islam is a 
requirement for citizenship). Thus Wahhabism holds the greatest hope of fostering expanded 
reciprocity in social interactions, since Islam is one thing that all Saudi citizens have in common. 
Though not primarily an economic institution, religion nevertheless serves to regulate economic, 
political, and social activity. Through the vehicle of Wahhabism, the Saud have funded the 
construction of beautiful mosques in cities around the world. The state export of religion by the 
Kingdom can be compared with the Florentine export of culture. Saudi Arabia’s reputation is 
enhanced internationally and Saudi citizens take pride in their Kingdom’s achievements. The 
                                                          
24
 For example, if women are granted permission to drive, hundreds of thousands of expatriate taxi drivers whose 
presence in Saudi Arabia is based on shuttling women will find themselves out of work. This will contribute to 
increased rates of Saudification in the workforce, but the foreign taxi drivers are not likely to be pleased (Seznec & 
Kirk 2010, 4).  
25
 This is currently happening. A search of Saudi Facebook groups yields results like “Barista’s Guild of Saudi 
Arabia”, “Wig Enthusiast’s Club” and several groups for people to post and solicit jobs. Of course, there’s also one 
called something like “Crush those who would shake the throne of the Kingdom” (in Arabic:  اق ـــحس  ــن م ل لواـح ــ نأ 
زه ي ـش رع يت ك ل ـمم ــ نا ك ام   ــناك), so social networking works for both sides.  
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Wahhabist sect of Islam is exporting its values and achievements to the benefit and pride of those 
at home. Mecca has been developed into a major tourist destination
26
 as Wahhabis encourage 
Muslims around the world to complete the hajj.  
 It would be inappropriate for non-Muslim Westerners to suggest doctrinal reforms within 
Wahhabist Islam that might foster social capital. This paper will therefore not speculate about 
possible internal religious reforms, but will instead focus on the current interactions and trends 
between the government, the religious establishment, and the people.  
 In 1924, after Abdul Aziz had consolidated his power and begun ruling his new nation, 
his allies the ikhwan found themselves without an enemy to fight. The religious confraternity had 
grown in size and power, and their leaders began to confront the Saud monarchy directly. King 
Aziz, they claimed, was not ruling in accordance with Wahhabist doctrine as they interpreted it. 
They presented a list of demands to the King, reminding him that his position as King was 
contingent on his ruling in according to strict Wahhabist tradition. The King was disinclined to 
acquiesce, and by 1927 enlisted the help of his new British allies to purge their ranks and wipe 
out the organization by force. This action is demonstrative of a consistent trait of Saud rule: 
religion is subordinate to the state. 
 From the rise of Islam to the present day, Muslims have circumvented Islamic 
prescriptions with ease when religious tenets conflicted with their interests (Kuran 2010). 
 In Saudi Arabia [the Koran…] remains the only recognized and enforceable code of law, 
so that the country is held in a 1300-year-old corset of town and desert morality that is 
deemed to be universally and eternally applicable - a fate that leads to a great many 
conflicts and expediencies. The insistence on unity as well as submission, however, was 
crucial to Muhammad, probably because it was the reverse of the actual disunity that 
existed in Arabia in his time - as, indeed, on many occasions since (Holden and Johns 
1982: 18).  
                                                          
26
 Thanks in no small part to the bin Laden family, of course.  
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Though Islam has dominated daily life on the Arabian Peninsula since the days of the Prophet, it 
has nonetheless been adapted to meet the current needs of the people. Wahhabism gained 
popularity because it was a reformulation of Islam which was relevant to the conditions in which 
the people of the Arabian Peninsula found themselves, and the convenient partnership between 
Wahhab and Saud was beneficial to both of these parties within this context. The church and 
state grew to become mutually reliant upon each other as they did in Florentine Italy. But the 
context within the Kingdom is changing, and so is the relationship between these two historical 
allies.  
 Historically, the Saudi government has defended its economic activity by emphasizing 
how its actions safeguard Islamic values, cultural heritage and traditions (Ramady 2010).
27
 They 
have done so by promoting modernization while attempting to avoid the appearance of 
westernization (Abdalla 1983) in terms of ideals of education, institutions and development.
28
 In 
addition, the Saud are careful to obtain the support of the ulama, the council of religious scholars 
who interpret laws. Continuing to package social reforms such as continued improvements to 
education, gender equality, and community mobilization initiatives under the pretext of 
economic reform makes these reforms more palatable to religious conservatives. 
 The Saud have historically relied upon the support of the Wahhabists to retain power, and 
though the relationship between church and state has changed since the rise of Saudi rentierism, 
the two entities remain intimately connected and to an extent co-dependent. While nationalism, 
                                                          
27
 Moreover, even cabinet ministers with a 'secular' educational background, who head mundane departments such 
as Industry, Electricity, or Planning, tend to phrase the rationale of their policies in religious terms.”(Nevo 1998: 36) 
28
 This also helps explain why the workings of the westernized Aramco have remained so isolated from the bulk of 
Saudi society. Many traditional Wahhabists would have cause to object about the decidedly un-Islamic Western 
culture which prevails within Aramco, so it has been generally isolated to avoid exposure and decrease public outcry. 
As long as the money keeps flowing, it seems that even conservative Wahhabist imams are disinclined to criticize 
this arrangement openly.  
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usually associated with modernization and secularization, preaches the love of society and state 
and promotes loyalty to them, in Saudi Arabia religious faith and loyalty to the ruling family 
have been the traditional components of the collective identity (Nevo 1998). The Saud have 
made persistent efforts to cultivate Wahhabism into both a state religion and an essential attribute 
of Saudi national identity. The latter aspect is meant to substitute the declining and anachronistic 
militant nature of Wahhabism (ibid.).  
 Traditionally, the religious sector has held the reins of the Saudi education system. As 
Nevo explains: 
Islamic issues account for more than a third of the reading material in the textbooks of the 
Saudi public schools. About a third of the elementary schools' curriculum is religious 
studies, and together with Arabic they make up more than half the curriculum. Similarly, 
a third of Saudi Arabia's university students major in Islamic studies. The state defines 
the main goal of its educational system as to promote Islamic values and 'to aim the 
students in the true Islamic direction'. The entire raison d'etre for the introduction of 
modern education into Saudi Arabia is that 'Islam teaches us that the pursuit of 
knowledge is a religious duty for every Muslim'. (1998, 36) 
 
 But this situation is not as beneficial as it once was. Changes are currently being made to 
reform the Kingdom’s primary and secondary education system to meet the Kingdom’s future 
needs. A $2.4 billion project called the King Abdullah Project for Public Education Development 
(KAPPED) began its first phase in 2007 with the creation of fifty ‘test’ schools in twenty-five 
provinces across Saudi Arabia to evaluate the viability of a number of potential reforms (Alyami 
2014: 1424). A related program, the Technical and Vocational Training Corporation (TVTC)  
aims to foster needs-based vocational training in industries which are expected to flourish in the 
Kingdom. The KAPPED is aimed at reforming primary and secondary school systems, which 
have traditionally been the domain of the religious establishment. The plan is to create a more 
practical curriculum for teaching exact sciences, research, and the scientific method. It will also 
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encourage extracurricular activities organized at the local level. The government is, as usual, 
careful to avoid publicizing the fact that this scheme signals a decline in the amount of Wahhabi 
religious courses taught in school (Seznec & Kirk 2010). The first phase relied heavily on 
Western-style education methods, which were quickly deemed unfit for application across the 
Kingdom’s schools. The pilot schemes are being modified, with input from teachers and local 
administrators, to fit the needs of Saudi society (Alyami 2014). 
 The Saud regime has been implementing these reforms with its usual cautious 
pragmatism, supplying international institutions like the UN with vague politicized data 
demonstrating progress in education reform while tiptoeing around the issue in domestic circles 
to avoid attracting the public ire of the ulama. But external observers (Alyami 2014; Seznec & 
Kirk 2010) confirm that reforms are indeed being implemented and change appears to be 
forthcoming. For example, many schools have been operating with little oversight or direction, 
resulting in vastly different education standards between schools and even between teachers. The 
TVTC has suggested that teachers’ pay be linked to performance in order to generate 
motivational impact (Alyami 2014).
29
 This is just one way in which these job-oriented education 
reforms have been fostering a capacity to aspire, not just among young Saudi students, but 
among Sauds in the public sector who are not accustomed to such performance accountability or 
productivity incentives.
30
  
                                                          
29
 These reforms, predictably, have not been popular with teachers accustomed to low performance standards. At 
some schools as many of 70% of faculty resisted the changes, and many quit (Alyami 2014: 1432). But the new 
standards are taught to young teachers-in-training in colleges and universities across the Kingdom, who will in 
coming years join the workforce and share this new paradigm with a new generation of Saudi youth.  
30
 The new standards included a self-evaluation portion which were important in encouraging teachers to identity 
areas of potential growth. The teachers were initially reluctant to participate in the process because of a cultural 
aversion to admitting weakness. Top levels of management were thus enlisted to participate, which signaled to the 
teachers this institutional paradigmatic shift, and the teachers participated more readily and productively. This 
demonstrates that top-down institutional change is being effectively modified for implementation within the cultural 
context of the Kingdom (Alzamil 2014: 141).  
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 King Abdullah was careful to include his name in the KAPPED, and for good reason. 
Education reform necessitates taking power from the Wahhabi establishment, which has 
traditionally propped up the Saud regime. By ensuring that his name was on the project, King 
Abdullah is encouraging the students to support him directly. He “branded” education reform 
under the Saud name, much as the Medici did with their patronage projects in Florence. As these 
children grow up to decide the new shape of the Saudi government, perhaps they will consider 
projects such as these which occurred during their childhoods, and will continue to support the 
Saud through the upcoming transition. Upon his appointment as Minister of Education in 2013, 
Prince Khaled summed up the context of Saudi education reform nicely when he said, “Through 
Islam the kingdom can prove to the world how it is capable of developing and progressing better 
than other states and without imitating the models of such states.” (cited in Pavel 2014, emphasis 
added). Framing the reforms in this manner reassures the religious sector that advances in 
education are not incompatible with Islam, and that they are being tailored to the unique needs of 
modern Saudi society.  
 Education is not the only part of Wahhabist authority that is being redefined within the 
Kingdom. Since the Ministry of Justice was formed in 1970
31
 the power of the religious 
establishment in Saudi Arabia’s courts has been steadily reduced (Nevo 1998), paving the way to 
reforms which aim to increase public faith in the justice system. The percentage of religious 
authorities within the King’s inner councils has been dwindling for decades. The ulama has seen 
its political power dwindle in recent years, to the point where it has virtually become a ‘rubber 
stamp’ agency which struggles to muster the political capital to refuse the King. The symbolic 
importance of Mecca is of such importance to the Saudi people that when it was threatened by 
                                                          
31
 Before this date, the rulings of the Grand Mufti were final and indisputable. After 1970, the Grand Mufti’s rulings 
became subject to the King’s approval.  
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extremists in 1979 the Kingdom instituted immediate reforms to reconfigure religious 
institutions under greater state control in an attempt to prevent the incident from being repeated. 
 Despite decreased religious participation in politics directly, Wahhabism remains a strong 
part of Saudi Arabian identity. Mosques dot the landscape and serve as social institutions for 
urban arrivals seeking socialization with those who share familiar historical identities. For 
hundreds of years, Wahhabism has performed tasks that could not be accomplished by the Saud 
alone. Wahhabism is adapting and evolving as the Saud dynasty proves itself increasingly 
capable and thus less reliant on Wahhabist legitimacy. The power of the ulama has increased 
whenever the Saud family needed additional legitimacy (Nevo 1998). If these current, ambitious 
reforms are successful, the Saud will have bolstered their own reputation of legitimacy 
independent of the 270-year-old Saud-Wahhab alliance. 
 The Saud are chipping away at aspects of this institution which are not useful to them 
anymore, and nurturing portions of the relationship which will be useful in the future. The 
KAICIID (King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural 
Dialogue), which also conspicuously flaunts the Saud family’s involvement, aims to emphasize 
“openness to all contemporary influential trends, in the domains of politics, research, academics, 
media, among others, and not limiting this openness to religious leadership alone” (KAICIID 
website cited in Pavel 2014, 41). 
 Islam remains a vital part of Saud identity, and the religion still has an important task to 
perform. It will likely retain much of its importance, but serve in a different capacity as 
rentierism declines. Currently the focus is shifting from Islam as the source of legitimacy of the 
ruling family to Islam as the source of the uniqueness of the Saudi nation. This is the regime's 
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best chance of drawing on the social capital and civic identity provided by the religion to secure 
the dynasty’s future in the 21st century.  
 
The Case for Tribalism: 
 Tribal identities have played a dominant role in shaping identity and behavior in the 
Peninsula for millennia. The historical relationship between tribe and state is therefore, 
unsurprisingly, very complex. Both institutions have been intertwined and connected through a 
variety of social, economic and political bonds (Maisel 2014). Tribes formed states, states 
integrated tribes, tribes strain against states and states exploit tribes for political legitimacy 
(Khoury and Kostiner 1990). 
 The mobile nature of the Bedouin prevented the type of stable republican governance 
which arose in Florence. Northern Italy had well-established territorial boundaries which had 
been shaped by interactions of jockeying city-states throughout the Middle Ages. Such emphasis 
on property ownership was foreign to the Bedouin, who considered the entire desert their home 
and had no use for national boundaries. Little changed over the centuries, and interactions were 
regulated by a social code which had largely been in place for as long as anyone could remember. 
Unlike the Tuscan landscape, pastoral nomadism is characterized by movement and mobility. In 
place of the relatively-sedentary Tuscan society’s emphasis on community or neighborhood 
solidarity, forms of Arab leadership and social solidarity had come to be expressed in familial or 
tribal terms. 
 Since books were cumbersome, record-keeping was based largely on oral tradition. 
Modern scholars know more about many aspects of 14th-century Florence, which safeguarded its 
knowledge in libraries, than about 19th-century Arabia. In place of books, the Bedouin had 
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developed a rich tradition of poetry and storytelling, and children learned social, economic and 
religious norms not in schools, but from the backs of camels swaying through the desert. 
 In the last century, the nomadic Bedouin have been specifically targeted for resettlement 
programs. As a mobile, independent segment of the population they pose a security problem for 
the Saud. Additionally, Saudi national objectives include sharing the fruits of economic 
development equally across all segments of society, and the nomadic Bedouin present challenges 
in achieving benchmarks for human development indices (Ramady 2010). Massive urban 
housing projects are made available only to nomadic peoples, who are offered free housing, 
education and healthcare if they choose to settle down. Not surprisingly, many choose to do so, 
but find it difficult to leave again once they arrive. Their camel herds which for thousands of 
years were vital to life in the desert are clearly a liability in the city. The herds are thus sold and 
the Bedouin, deprived of their traditional livelihood, become trapped in the cities, reliant on the 
welfare that the Saudi government funds through its oil profits. Tribal ties, which served as the 
dominant form of social interaction within Saudi Arabia for over a thousand years, have been 
sidelined during the last century and these new city-dwellers must now adjust to their new 
political, social, and economic realities (Maisel 2014).  
 That the king derives his power and authority from tribal identities is reflected in his 
official title: he is not merely the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but also “shaykh al-
mashayikh (Chief of the [tribal] chiefs)” (Nevo 2014, 45). Even today, tribal identities exert 
influence on social interactions. Marriages to someone from a rival tribe are almost unthinkable, 
and millions of dollars in ‘blood money’ changes hands annually as the result of feuding tribes. 
“People of different tribal background might work and live together, but they still respect the 
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invisible line that separates them from the ‘other’ and regulates or limits any interaction” (Maisel 
2014, 104). Thompson describes why they retain their importance: 
There are an estimated eighty separate tribal groupings in the Kingdom and it can be 
argued that tribalism constitutes a form of protection and networking in the absence of 
civil society institutions in the Kingdom. This lack of an intermediate strata means that 
there is nothing or no one to protect the individual from the state and, for this reason, 
people turn back to tribal and kinship ties as a form of societal protection and security. 
(2011, 175) 
 
In other words, citizens turn to tribes to solve their problems when the state is unable or 
unwilling to do so. This obviously presents the danger of conflicting loyalties which is only 
recently beginning to be openly addressed by the government.  
 The King Abdulluh Center for National Dialogue (KACND) is beginning to address the 
changing role of tribal affiliations in modern Saudi society. Though the program began in 2003, 
it has been expanded to include aspects of cultural discourse. This explicitly includes open 
discussion of the role of tribes in society, which for many years were taboo in the Kingdom. 
Secretary General Al’Muammar announced in 2009 that the semiannual conferences, which 
would take place in locations throughout the kingdom, would engage intellectual elites in public 
discussions with the express goal of “activat[ing] the role of civil society institutions in tackling 
and treating cultural issues” (Thompson 2011, 168). A conference in late 2010 addressed the 
topic of tribalism in Saudi society directly. Participants noted that “administrative favoritism” 
along tribal lines remained a hindrance to development, and suggested that a focus on the nuclear 
family instead of the tribe as a focus of development may help to de-emphasize tribal disputes 
and serve national interests (ibid., 171). Wasta has served to entrench tribal affiliations in 
government, and many ministries as well as the National Guard tend to be tribally homogenous. 
Applicants for government positions are asked not about their qualifications, but about their 
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tribal affiliations. Saudi citizens currently understand that tribalism is harmful to development, 
but they must rely on tribal allegiances in order to interact with partisan government officials. 
Addressing this problem is one of the greatest challenges facing the Saud in its attempts to 
reform.  
 Though the KACND is still in its nascent stages and has received criticism for its 
exclusivity, it is indicative of the government’s apparent efforts to facilitate connections between 
people and the government, ‘break the ice’ between various constituencies, and created new 
socio-political spaces for individuals to publicly discuss common issues (Thompson 2011, 178). 
Institutional changes take time, and it remains to be seen how the KACND and other public 
forums will serve the interests of various segments of society. But one consequence of the 
KACND is already becoming evident. Publicly televised KACND forums have spurred 
conversation on issues such as tribalism, wasta and national identity in homes and other 
locations throughout Saudi Arabia simply by legitimizing their discussion. This shift in public 
discourse and media freedom, like the value of Florentine cultural goods, cannot be objectively 
measured but is nevertheless tangible within the Kingdom (ibid.) as people are beginning to 
believe that their voices are being heard and that improvements in women’s rights and education 
are indeed possible. The rifts between different segments of society are beginning to close.  
 Social networking has even become a tool for traditional tribes to connect; Facebook 
groups like “Shabana Family Int.”, a tribal affiliated group with a thousand members, are 
becoming commonplace as places for tribes to connect over great distances. Though social media 
can contribute to tribal tension, it can also alleviate it by exposing people to opposing views and 
connecting them along lines other than those of family or tribe.  
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 Recently, reforms in education and economic freedom have begun to foster the creation 
of new identities which have begun to undermine the importance of tribal affiliation to status, 
which results in a homogenizing effect on social integration (Thompson 2011). The fact that 
tribalism is more common among marginalized groups than among well-integrated urban 
inhabitants shows that people cling to outdated tribal ideals when they have few alternatives 
(Maisel 2014).  
 Tribes are an important part of Saudi identity, and though aspects of tribalism stand as an 
obstacle to reform, they still perform important functions in developing and shaping human 
capital. They, too, can find a place in a modern Saudi Arabia. Maisel explains the function of 
tribes in fostering social capital within new contexts: 
The twenty-first century sees tribal groups boosting their pride and leverage. They are 
recognized as a potent actor within the Saudi social contract. Today, tribal leaders seek 
stronger participation in public discourse and leadership; tribal judges cooperate with 
religious and state authorities in large-scale legal operations and cases; the young 
generation of tribal members proudly shows off its identity in public; popular television 
shows become tools for propagating tribal histories and animosities; and camel contests 
still earn the highest prize-money in the kingdom. (2014, 118-119) 
 
 These functions are reminiscent of guild operations in Florence. Though individuals were 
loyal to one guild or another, their primary loyalty remained with their nuclear families and the 
state. Tribal identity is not incompatible with a greater civic identity. The problem that tribalism 
causes in modern Saudi society is its influence over government.  
 As the result of over fifty years of rentier policies in the Kingdom, wasta has grown as a 
social institution that could meet the needs of the people in the absence of other, more equitable 
forms of interaction. The Saudi bureaucracy has become an impenetrable web of allegiances 
based not on merit, but on relationships. As rentierism falls, the Saudi government will need to 
present citizens with a viable alternative to tribal loyalties: one with loyalties to the state and the 
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Saudi people instead of to a single tribe or patron. As dialogue about these issues becomes more 
available, citizens will seek channels to increase accountability and transparency in governance, 
and the Saud will have to decide how to respond. Uprooting the traditional, unproductive ties 
will be difficult, but the risk of allowing them to remain is potentially greater in the context of 
the fall of rentierism. If the Saud can successfully remove tribal partisanship from government, 
the tribes can more easily adapt their functions to the new society without restraining economic, 
social, or political progress.  
 
Conclusion: 
 The largest source of difficulty in Saudi governance has been adapting society to the 
swift and fundamental restructuring of the economy which arose as a consequence of oil rents. 
Institutions take time to adapt, specialize, and naturally emerge (Huntington 1968). Oil revenue 
enabled the King to drastically and rapidly alter conditions which had shaped society on the 
Arabian Peninsula for over a thousand years, and the community has not yet had time to adapt to 
its new environment. The Renaissance was a process, not an event. “Nations do not remake 
themselves in fundamental ways by deliberate intention any more than do villages” (Banfield 
1958, 166). The interconnectedness of the social, political, economic and religious realms is 
complicated, even for those living inside such a society, and small unanticipated changes within 
one realm can influence other realms with unforeseeable consequences.  
 The focus of this paper has been exploring the possibilities for a future Saud state without 
rentierism. It examined the ways by which institutions shaped social capital in the development 
of a prosperous Florentine society which rejected democratic republicanism. These two case 
studies have many similarities, and their primary difference for the purpose of this essay was the 
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existence of a high versus low level of social capital. The purpose was to combine various 
academic disciplines in an attempt to approach this issue from a unique perspective. The 
methodology was to examine how the social capital theory may assist the Saud in planning for 
the institutional changes that will accompany the Kingdom’s increasing difficulty in sustaining 
rentierism.  
 The guilds of Florence provide unique perspectives into the relationship between society, 
economics, and politics, but the institutions arose from natural conditions over hundreds of years 
to fill specific roles in society. The people of Saudi Arabia live under greatly different conditions, 
and it is unrealistic to expect that institutions which perform as the guilds did will be successful 
in responding to the needs of modern Saudi Arabia. Despite the temporary success of Florentine 
institutions, the guilds also prevented the city from adapting to changing internal and external 
conditions, leading to the end of the Renaissance and the shift of hegemony to other regions.  
 However, the guilds highlight several key points which may illuminate the Kingdom’s 
future plans. Firstly, social capital and economic activity are linked; any attempts by the Saud to 
encourage economic growth while ignoring social institutions will be unsuccessful. Secondly, 
fostering social capital doesn’t necessarily lead to democratic governance, as shown by the 
Florentine rejection of republicanism in favor of a powerful family whom they admired for their 
services to the community. There is no reason to assume that a post-rentier government will 
necessarily exclude the Saud from continuing their rule. Thirdly, the Kingdom’s export of Islam 
can be compared to the Florentine export of culture. Though the institution of Wahhabism is 
being adapted to meet new needs, the religion still has an important part to play in Saudi society 
as well as global perceptions of the Kingdom. The Saudi Arabian brand of Islam exerts great 
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cultural influence on the rest of the Islamic world, and the Kingdom currently has the power to 
shape the opinions of billions of people.  
 In 1992, King Fahd declared that Western democracy is unsuitable for Saudi society and 
traditions (Ahrari 1997). He was probably correct that Western institutions are unlikely to 
succeed in modern Saudi Arabia if adopted wholesale. But democracy cannot be categorically 
rejected as a viable option in Muslim countries, and the Kingdom has demonstrated that it is 
capable of adapting Western institutions to meet its peculiar set of needs. Initiatives such as 
KAPPED, KACND, the Cities and Guilds program, the KAICCND, the TVTC and others are 
designed to promote social capital, economic participation, civic identity and Saudi nationalism. 
Their success thus far has been limited since sustained rentierism presents stubborn obstacles, 
but as Saudi society builds social capital, rentierism will become less vital. Welfare programs 
will begin to decline and society will leverage its social capital to guide a transformation of 
economic, social, and political interactions. Most importantly, perhaps, is the fact that the 
programs are so strongly associated with the ruling family. Though social reform is continually 
being adapted to match the unique and changing needs of Saudi society, the Saud dynasty is 
careful to emphasize its own contribution to progress. The Medici in Florence were loved by the 
people because of their patronage and successful efforts to make Tuscany great. If the Saud 
continue to maintain these initiatives, focusing on transforming traditional tribal ties, religious 
observances and economic activity to create institutions to meet future needs, then the ruling 
family stands a chance of becoming popular enough to maintain power in the event that 
unforeseeable political changes bring increased democratic ideals to the Kingdom.  
 No single reform can prepare Saudi society for the challenges it will face in the 21st 
century, and no single institution appears poised to fill the dominant role in society that the 
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guilds achieved in Renaissance Florence. Social capital will grant a degree of flexibility in 
enabling society to respond to changes by allowing the population greater freedom to contribute. 
Though multiple institutions exist which could potentially enhance the development of social 
capital, each also has limitations to growth under the current system of rentierism. As long as 
rentierism dominates in Saudi Arabia, it will present significant obstacles to developing social 
capital. However, since the 1970s (and increasing in pace during the last decade) the Saud have 
begun to address this shortcoming and nurture the aspects of institutions which promote regime 
stability and social capital.  
 Luckily for the Saud, rentierism is not likely to collapse overnight.  The Saud understand 
that their society will experience a gradual transition, and the government is implementing 
change at a pace which both reflects and shapes continuous changes in society. Of all the sectors 
of Saud reform, those targeting the youth are the most important. Reforms in education and job 
creation will build social capital among the younger generation of Saudi citizens; this younger 
generation will be important in shaping a Saudi future without rentierism. The Saud are actively 
taking steps to reduce their dependence on Wahhabism, building their own family branding 
independent of the aspects of Wahhabism which, while they once served a useful purpose, are no 
longer valuable to the 21st Century Saud dynasty. The Saud are also reevaluating their position 
within the context of tribal identities within the Kingdom, which are being naturally reformed by 
millions of individuals struggling to adapt to changing circumstances. Akhi, gedik, and futuwwa 
arose to meet a certain set of needs, and aspects of these institutions spread into the Arabian 
Peninsula to fulfill specific tasks. When conditions changed, they became irrelevant and were 
replaced or incorporated into new institutions. Tribalism and wasta were developed by nomads 
on the backs of camels, not in the modern city of Riyadh, but these concepts too are evolving to 
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meet the new needs of Saudi society. As rentierism declines, all these social factors will shift and 
rise to meet the new needs of the populace. The Saud must take care to carefully guide these 
reforms. If not implemented with a holistic perspective, they may fuel extremism.  
 Engagement with history will help Saudi society better understand and adapt to its new 
environment much more than the wholesale superimposition of Western institutions. As Saudi 
Arabians understand how their communities, values, and institutions evolved over centuries to 
meet the unique challenges of life on the Arabian Peninsula. Social capital will help modern 
Saudi society understand how best to adapt aspects of traditional society to meet changing needs. 
Institutions will evolve naturally as people find their place. The tendency of Western political 
scientists to criticize the slow pace of Saud reforms demonstrates a failure to appreciate the 
complexity and richness of the Saudi cultural landscape. The Saud must constantly reconcile 
changing conditions with respect for the tradition, culture and beliefs of the people. They are 
doing all they can now to secure their place at the head of the Saudi state in the future.  
 In many ways we are still developing our understanding of the relationship between 
social capital and development. We have a basic understanding of how a state’s development is 
shaped by rentierism, but we know very little about how various social forces and institutions 
shape a state which is experiencing a transition away from rentierism. Saudi Arabia’s access to 
substantial financial resources and political capital will likely help stabilize the state as it 
transitions, but the influence of the various factors which will shape this transition can currently 
only be speculated. It would be useful to apply these lessons to Arab nations such as Yemen and 
the United Arab Emirates which have adopted divergent strategies in response to oil revenue. 
The inclusion of Jordan, which has no oil to speak of, can further place into context the shape of 
social capital in the modern Arab world. 
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 Florence was unable to sustain the high economic and cultural output of the Renaissance 
due to an inability to adapt to changing external conditions. The Saud have an advantage over the 
Medici; they can see the crisis coming a generation in advance and can begin now to plan for it. 
It remains to be seen whether King Salman and his successors will continue to follow King 
Abdulluh’s vision of reform. Future research will be better-informed and scholars in the future 
will have the benefit of knowing whether the current reforms will be successful. An enhanced 
understanding of the relationship between social capital and development will help other nations 
in all parts of the world focus their own development strategies and adapt historical lessons to 
their own unique and changing needs.  
  Taken together, the narratives of social capital in Florence and Saudi Arabia offer the 
international community insight into how systemic internal change may unfold in Middle Eastern 
states transitioning from rentierism. Social capital is not necessarily correlated to democratic 
political systems, nor is it universally beneficial for a regime or society. Modern monarchs 
seeking to extend their dynasty’s tenure would do well to consider the Medici lessons of the 
importance of patronage and personal branding. This comparison also offers insights into how 
institutions react to various shocks. Just as Florence’s success can offer insight into the role of 
social capital in long-term dynastic political strategies, the failures of Florentine guilds at the end 
of the Renaissance help modern politicians and researchers to better understand the need for both 
contingency planning and institutional flexibility. 
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